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The Supreme Court's first hundred years virtually ended with
the death of Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite in March 1888. Five
of Waite's brethren-Stanley Matthews, Samuel F. Miller, Joseph
P. Bradley, Samuel Blatchford, and Lucius Q.C. Lamar-left the
Court within the next five years, and a sixth-Stephen J.
Field-hung on after his powers had faded.1 By 1894, Melville W.
Fuller 2 presided over an essentially new Court consisting of David
J. Brewer, Henry B. Brown, George Shiras, Howell E. Jackson, and
Edward Douglass White3 in addition to the three holdovers, John
M. Harlan, Horace Gray, and Field. Jackson and Field soon gave
way to Rufus W. Peckham and Joseph McKenna; Gray and Shiras,
after the turn of the century, were replaced by Oliver Wendell
Holmes and William R. Day. William H. Moody and Horace R.
Lurton served briefly at the end of Fuller's term, and another massive turnover accompanied Fuller's death in 1910. Thus the personnel of Fuller's twenty-one-year tenure is well separated from
that of the preceding and following periods. Moreover, although
twenty Justices sat during this time, eleven did the lion's share of
the work: Harlan, Gray, Fuller, Brewer, Brown, Shiras, White,
t Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I thank Karla Kraus and
Richard Levy for valuable research assistance, Mitchell Daffner for taming the computer,
Richard Helmholz, Richard Posner, and Cass R. Sunstein for helpful comments, and the
Jerome S. Weiss Faculty Research Fund for helping to make this study possible.
I See WILLARD KING, MELVILLE WESTON FULLER 222-27 (1950); CARL SWISHER, STEPHEN

J. FIELD, CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 442-45 (1930). Both recount Field's riposte when Harlan,
deputed to suggest it was time Field resign, asked whether Field recalled a similar errand he
had run in the case of Justice Grier: "Yes! And a dirtier day's work I never did in my life!"
W.

KING,

supra, at 224; C.

SWISHER,

supra, at 444. The source of the quotation is

CHARLES

EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 76 (1928).
2 A longtime friend and adviser of President Cleveland, Fuller, who had practiced law
in Chicago, was little known elsewhere, and his appointment was a surprise. See W. KING,
supra note 1, ch. 8.
3 For conflicting evidence as to the spelling of White's middle name, see MARIE
KLINKHAMER, EDWARD DOUGLAS [sic] WHITE, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES 1 n.1

(1943). Cf. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A PreliminaryInquiry, 50 U.
REV. 466, 468 (1983) (discussing the case of Justice Duval[l]).
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Peckham, McKenna, Holmes, and Day.4
Most of these Justices are not household names, but their decisions are. Under Fuller, the Court first employed the due process
clause to invalidate state legislation in such cases as Allgeyer v.
Louisiana,5 Smyth v. Ames, 6 and Lochner v. New York. 7 It struck
down barriers to the sale of out-of-state liquor under the commerce clause in Leisy v. Hardin.8 It invalidated the federal income
tax in Pollock v. Farmers'Loan & Trust Co." and held that manufacturing was not "commerce" in United States v. E.C. Knight
Co.10 It made constitutional limits on state action more easily enforceable by limiting the immunity of state officers in a series of
decisions culminating in Ex parte Young."
Yet it would be a mistake to brand the Fuller Court as generally hostile to either state or federal authority. The states' power
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10 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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to enforce racial segregation of trains was upheld in Plessy v. Ferguson.1 2 Congress was found to have inherent power to exclude and
deport aliens, 13 and In re Debs'4 upheld the authority of a federal
court to enjoin a strike that disrupted commerce, although no statute had granted such authority. The Insular Cases15 authorized
Congress to govern possessions acquired after the Spanish-American War without regard to various constitutional limitations. In
fact, the Court under Fuller employed a wide variety of techniques
to protect economic interests, including both broad and narrow
constructions of federal authority and procedural as well as substantive aspects of due process.
The Fuller Court's activism in protecting economic interests
contrasts sharply with the judicial restraint of its predecessor, but
the differences should not be exaggerated. Most state regulatory
laws affecting business passed muster, including limits on the
working hours of miners, 6 women, 7 and public works employees."8
The Sherman Act was found applicable to several business arrangements not falling within a strict definition of interstate or
foreign, commerce.' 9 Congress was allowed to forbid interstate
transportation of lottery tickets2 0 and to impose prohibitive
taxes. 2 ' The erosion of protection for vested contract rights continued when the Court allowed a state to rescind a grant of submerged land22 and held that a state could not be sued in federal
court by its own citizens for defaulting on a bond contract.23
Amid all these politically charged cases, the Court found time
to devote itself seriously to the more prosaic problem of distributing judicial authority among the states in a series of full-faith-andcredit decisions that form the basis of our current law.2 4 Moreover,

12 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

"3The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698 (1893).
'4 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
5 See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
16 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
:7 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
18 Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903).
19 E.g., Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 325-27 (1904) (creation of a
corporation to hold the shares of two competing railroads violates the Sherman Act).
:0 The Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
' McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
:2 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
3s Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
24 See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892); Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186
(1900); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906); Fauntleroy v. Lure, 210 U.S. 230 (1908);
Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909).

The Supreme Court: 1889-1910

the cases mentioned are but the tip of an iceberg. In these two
decades, the Court waded through nearly a thousand constitutional
controversies-more than in the entire preceding century. A great
many of these cases required only the application of settled principle. The discretionary writ of certiorari, introduced in 1891,25 had
enabled the Supreme Court to keep its collective head above the
flood of nonconstitutional cases;"6 the extension of certiorari to
constitutional cases was long overdue by 1910.27
The present article is devoted to the economic decisions of the
Fuller Court; a sequel will discuss the remaining decisions of the
time. As in similar studies of the Court's first hundred years,2 8 the
aim of both is to criticize, from a lawyer's point of view, the constitutional work of the Fuller period as a whole.2"
I.

THE FURTHER DECLINE OF THE CONTRACT CLAUSE

It seems ironic that the Fuller period, best known for giving
life to the questionable doctrine that due process guaranteed the
right to make contracts in the future, began with two important
decisions that diminished the explicit protection that article I, section 10 provided for contracts already made.
A.

Hans v. Louisiana
The eleventh amendment had made enforcement of a state's
2' Act of Mar. 3, 1891, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828.

2' For discussions of the effect of the 1891 Act on the docket, see F. FRANKFURTER & J.
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 101-02 (1928); W. KING, supra note 1, at 14851.
27 For a discussion of the belated achievement of this goal, culminating in the Act of
Feb. 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936, see F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 26, at 203-16.
28 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT. THE FIRST HUNDRED

YEARS (forthcoming 1985).

" Pending publication of the relevant volume in the series HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, general historical coverage of the Fuller era remains relatively
sparse. Charles Warren's treatment of what was to him a recent period was intentionally

sketchy. See 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY chs. 37-38
(rev. ed. 1926). Andrew McLaughlin's discussion was almost as brief. See ANDREW McLAUGHLIN,

A

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

of Justices of the time include FRANCIS

chs. 50-51 (1935). Biographies

BIDDLE, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES

(1939);
1870-1882 (1963);

MAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT
WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS,

(1942);

CHARLES FAIR-

MARK HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER
MARK HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER

WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS, 1841-1870 (1957); W. KING, supra note 1; M.
KLINKHAMER, supra note 3; FRANK LATHAM, THE GREAT DISSENTER: JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN,
1833-1911 (1970); MATTHEW McDEViTT, JOSEPH MCKENNA, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED
STATES (1946); JOSEPH MCLEAN, WILLIAM RUFUS DAY (1946); GEORGE SHIRAS, JUSTICE
GEORGE SHIRAS JR. OF PITTSBURGH (1953); C. SWISHER, supra note 1.
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promises difficult by closing the federal courts to actions against
states by citizens of other states or of foreign countries, and the
Court had convincingly concluded before Fuller's appointment
that a state's immunity could not be evaded either by having another state sue on behalf of its citizens30 or by suing to require an
individual official to discharge the state's debt.3 1 But the amendment did not forbid suits against states by their own citizens, and
it was the Fuller Court2 that closed that loophole in the 1890 case
3
of Hans v. Louisiana.
Another chapter in the disreputable history of bond repudiation by Southern states after Reconstruction, 33 Hans was an action
by a Louisiana citizen against his own state for interest due on its
bonds. Although the eleventh amendment itself was inapplicable,
the Court said that its adoption showed that the country had disagreed with the decision in Chisholm v. Georgia34 that article III's
provision extending federal judicial power to "Controversies . . .
between a State and Citizens of another State" embraced suits
against unconsenting states. In its literal application of the words
of article III, Justice Bradley concluded, Chisholm had ignored the
teaching of "history and experience" 3 5 that "[t]he suability of a
State without its consent was a thing unknown to the law."3 6 Quoting convincing passages from Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall,
the Court emphasized that "[a]ny such power as that of authorizing the federal judiciary to entertain suits by individuals against
the States, had been expressly disclaimed, and even resented, by
the great defenders of the Constitution whilst it was on its trial
before the American people. '3 7 These views were as applicable to
Hans as they had been to Chisholm; the appeal to the "letter" in
both cases was "an attempt to strain the Constitution and the law
to a construction never imagined or dreamed of." 38 It would be ab-

30
3,

New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883).
E.g., Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1886), discussed in D.

CURRIE,

supra

note 28, ch. 12; Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 720-21 (1883). Despite the questionable
conclusion in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), that a
suit against an officer for restitution or an injunction was not a suit against the state, the
Court soundly concluded that an officer was not suable when he himself had done no wrong.
See D. CURRIE, supra note 28, chs. 4, 12.
3- 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
"3 See D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 12.
34 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 1.
35 Hans, 134 U.S. at 14.
36

Id. at 16.

37 Id. at 12.
38 Id. at 15.
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surd to allow suits against one's own state while prohibiting those
against others; "[tihe truth is, that the cognizance of suits and actions unknown to the law, and forbidden by the law, was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial
power of the United States[,] '"
and the suit could not be
maintained.
Some later observers have professed to find that Hans "construed" the eleventh amendment itself to apply to suits against the
plaintiff's own state; 0 others have written that it invoked a common law principle that could be overridden by statute. 4 1 But the
passages just quoted leave very little doubt that the basis of the
decision was that article III's provision extending the judicial
power to "Cases arising under this Constitution" was subject to an
implied exception for suits by individuals against nonconsenting
states.' 2 In favor of this conclusion, as Bradley noted,'43 were all the
arguments that had made Chisholm itself questionable. 44 Furthermore, implicit state immunities from the operation of express fed-

Id.
10 See, e.g., CHARLES WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 287 & n.6 (4th ed. 1983); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,83
39

COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 1893-94 (1983).

"1See, e.g., Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 313 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Field, The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines (pt. 1), 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 537 &
n.81 (1977).
4 Accord Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health
& Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 291-92 (Marshall, J., concurring) (Hans made it clear that the
eleventh amendment restored "the original understanding" of art. III); see also id. at 281
n.1 (Douglas, J., for the Court) (Hans dealt with "constitutional constraints on the exercise
of the federal judicial power"). Bradley had said in an earlier opinion that the Constitution
did not support jurisdiction in such cases. See Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269, 337-38
(1885) (Bradley, J., dissenting). Hans rejected the unnecessary statement irt
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 412 (1821), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 4, that
immunity was no bar to federal-question suits against one's own state. See Hans, 134 U.S.
at 20. Harlan's concurrence observed that, although Chisholm had been rightly decided, the
suit in Hans was "not one to which the judicial power of the United States extends." Id. at
21. That Iredell's dissent in Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 429-50, which Hans approved, had
been explicitly based on statutory rather than on constitutional grounds does not impair the
impact of Bradley's repeated references to the Constitution.
43

134 U.S. at 15.

See D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 1 (discussing the arguments made in Chisholm).
Indeed, as Harlan seemed to imply in his concurrence, 134 U.S. at 21, the argument for
jurisdiction was stronger in Chisholm than in Hans because, in the former case, the constitutional text expressly extended federal judicial power to controversies between a state and
citizens of another state. The eleventh amendment may well have been drafted narrowly to
modify this offending language and not to allow federal-question suits brought by a citizen
against his own state.
44
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eral authority were no novelty when Hans was decided." It is nevertheless noteworthy that a Court destined to give unprecedented
protection to certain economic interests opted, in a case that could
have gone either way, for an interpretation of the jurisdictional
provisions that severely impaired the protection of existing contract rights.4 6
" See, e.g., Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 128 (1871) (Congress may not tax

state judge's salary); cf. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 103, 107-08 (1861)
(Congress may not impose duties on state officer despite implicit authority to implement
extradition clause); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) (state may
not tax national bank). Less persuasive was Bradley's additional argument in Hans that a
statute making federal jurisdiction "concurrent" with state jurisdiction meant that the federal court could act only in cases that state courts would hear. 134 U.S. at 18. For the
counterargument, see D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 1.
"' In Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) (Brewer, J.), however, the
Court held that a county could be sued on its bonds because a county was not a "state," for
eleventh amendment purposes, but a separate corporation with powers of its own. Though
in accord with the earlier decision that a county was a "citizen" of a state for diversity
purposes, Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118, 121-22 (1869), which Luning did
not cite on this point, this decision is not easy to reconcile with the conclusion in North Am.
Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 313 (1908), that the fourteenth amendment applied not only to "State[s]" but to the actions of their political subdivisions as
well-as the purpose of the amendment seemed to require. Compare the implicit immunity
of states from federal regulation proclaimed in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833, 845 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S.Ct. 1005
(1985), which apparently extended to political subdivisions.
In the same spirit as Hans was the decision in Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 445-49
(1900) (Harlan, J.) (relying on Hans), holding that a federal corporation, though not a "Citizen[] of another State" within the eleventh amendment, also could not sue a state in a
federal-question case. Hans was distinguished, however, in United States v. Texas, 143 U.S.
621, 643-46 (1892) (also written by Harlan), in which the Court allowed the United States to
sue a state; judicial resolution of controversies "between these two governments. . . does no
violence to the inherent nature of sovereignty," id. at 646. Furthermore, Harlan noted, "the
permanence of the Union might be endangered if to some tribunal was not entrusted the
power to determine [such controversies]." Id. at 645. In reaching this convincing result,
Harlan appropriately relied on the Court's longstanding practice, derived from an explicit
provision of the Articles of Confederation, of entertaining suits by one state against another.
See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 727 (1838) (discussing art.
IX of the Articles). The Fuller Court continued this practice, explicitly rejecting the defense
of sovereign immunity in such cases. See, e.g., Virginia v. West Virginia, 206 U.S. 290, 31819 (1907) (Fuller, C.J.); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 82-84 (1907) (Brewer, J.); South
Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 316-18 (1904) (Brewer, J.); cf. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15
(discussing interstate suits: "The establishment of this new branch of jurisdiction seemed to
be necessary from the extinguishment of diplomatic relations between the States.").
In Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331 (1907) (Fuller, C.J.) (alternative holding),
however, the Court unanimously held that United States v. Texas was a one-way street: a
state could not sue the United States without its consent because "[p]ublic policy forbids
that conclusion." 204 U.S. at 342. The public policy in question was not identified, and it
would seem that "the permanence of the Union" might be equally "endangered" by the
want of a tribunal when the state is a plaintiff as when it is a defendant in a controversy
"between these two governments." The Court's question-begging explanation that the state
had consented to be sued by joining the Union, id., could have been applied as easily to the

19851
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Illinois Central and Manigault

Two years after Hans the Court undertook a sharp limitation
of the substantive protection afforded by the contract clause itself.
The Illinois legislature had, under shady circumstances, 7 granted
virtually all the land under Chicago's harbor to a railroad and then
attempted to take\ it back. The case looked for all the world like
Fletcher v. Peck,4" where Marshall had held that a state could not
rescind its grant. Yet, in a lengthy opinion, supporting a 4-3 decision, by no less a friend of private property than Justice Field, the
Court held that Illinois had validly reclaimed the land.49
converse case or to Hans v. Louisiana.
That a state could actually consent to be sued even by a private party in federal court,
see D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 12 (discussing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883)), was
reaffirmed in Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line, 200 U.S. 273, 292 (1906) (White, J.). Smith v.
Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900), made it clear, however, that it was not enough for federal
jurisdiction that the state had consented to be sued in its own courts and added the peculiar
qualification-explained only by a cryptic reference to "the supremacy of the Constitution"
and of federal laws-"that the final judgment of the highest court of the State in any action
brought against it with its consent may be reviewed or reexamined" in the Supreme Court if
the case contains a federal question. Id. at 445 (dictum).
Finally, ignoring Marshall's express alternative holding in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 393-94 (1821), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 4, that the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction in cases "in which a State shall be Party" was limited to those
cases in which the only basis of federal jurisdiction is that a state is a party, the Court, in
United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892), upheld its original jurisdiction over a suit by
the United States against a state, concluding that article III, section 2, clause 2 comprehended "all cases mentioned in the preceding clause in which a State may, of right, be made
a party defendant." Id. at 644. Within three years, the Court underlined the importance of
the word "defendant" by reaffirming Cohens's conclusion that the Court had no original
jurisdiction of a federal-question suit by a state against its own citizens. California v. Southern Pac. Co., 157 U.S. 229, 257-58 (1895) (apparently restating the rule to allow original
jurisdiction whenever federal judicial power was based upon "the character of the parties").
47 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 451-52 (1892); see 3 BESSIE PIERCE, A
HISTORY OF CHICAGO 319 (1957) (reporting that the granting statute "was commonly known

as the 'Lake Front Steal' "). Marshall's refusal to investigate legislative motive in the similar
circumstances of Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), made it difficult for the
Court to invalidate the grant on grounds of bribery or improper influence, though technically the fact that the state was a party would have served to distinguish Marshall's decisive
point in Fletcher, which was that it would be "indecent, in the extreme," to inquire into
legislative corruption when the state was not a party to the suit, id. at 131. Nevertheless,
one cannot know to what extent the result in Illinois Central was influenced by the sense
that the deal was less than honest.
4' 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 5.
4, Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). Fuller and Blatchford did not participate. Id. at 476. For the argument that this decision was another manifestation of the
same hostility to special privileges that had led to Field's dissent in the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83-111 (1873), see McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parametersof Laissez Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 246, 258-59 (L. Friedman & H. Scheiber eds. 1978). For a discussion of the Slaughter-House Cases, see D.
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The key distinction, in Field's view, was that the land in the
Illinois case lay under water. Though the state owned submerged
land, it did so as trustee for the public interest in navigation, and
it had no power to sell in violation of its public trust. Since the
original transfer had thus been invalid, no contractual obligation
was impaired when the state rescinded the grant.50
The words flow easily off the pen; no fancy reasoning is needed
to show that a trustee's powers are limited by the terms of his
trust. What powers the people of Illinois had given their legislature, however, would appear to depend upon Illinois' constitution,
to which Field never referred. In default of Illinois authority, he
invoked a number of decisions from other jurisdictions, not one of
which, he conceded, 51 had held a legislative grant of submerged
land invalid. The leading Supreme Court precedent cited had expressly declined to decide whether even the King of England possessed the power, as a trustee for the British people, to make such
a grant and had added that the validity of a grant made by authority of the people of a state "must. . .be tried and determined by
different principles from those which apply to grants of the British
."52 A New York case heavily quoted by Field appeared
crown ...
to suggest that the King could alienate submerged land so long as
the public right of navigation was reserved,5 3 as it had been in Illinois Central.5 4 In a dictum significantly omitted from Field's opinion, the New York court had added that the legislature could authorize even the obstruction of navigation.5 5 Justice Shiras, in a

supra note 28, ch. 10.
146 U.S. at 452-62.

CURRIE,
50

51Id. at 455.
52 Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410-11 (1842), cited in Illinois
Central, 146 U.S. at 456. The case held that the "proprietors" of New Jersey, under whom
Waddell claimed, had no title to convey after surrendering back to the crown in 1702 the
political powers the King had originally granted them. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 412-14. Far from
claiming that it had no right to convey submerged land, as Justice Thompson pointed out in
dissent, id. at 420-21, New Jersey had actually proceeded to do so. See also Sax, The Public
Trust Doctrine in NaturalResource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV.
471, 476 (1970) ("[T]he inability of the Sovereign to alienate Crown lands was not a restriction upon government generally, but only upon the King ....").
53People v. New York & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 76-77 (1877), quoted in
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 458.
5
146 U.S. at 405 n.1.
55People v. New York & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 77-78 (1877) (citing English authority); see BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 149
n.118 (1938) ("Some of the state cases seem definitely to contradict [Field's] point of
view."). Indeed, a state's power to obstruct navigation seemed implicit in a long line of
Supreme Court cases allowing states to authorize bridges over navigable streams despite
their interference with interstate commerce. See, e.g., Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3
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brief and telling dissent joined by Gray and Brown, came up with
Supreme Court dicta and state-court holdings sustaining the power
to convey.56
Apart from precedent, Field's argument from first principles
itself had serious internal difficulties. He attempted throughout to
equate the grant of ownership with the relinquishment of "control"
over navigation of the overlying waters. 7 The New York case on
which he relied so heavily had emphasized that a grant of submerged land did not imply a surrender of the public right to navigation or of the state's power to protect that right by legislation.5 8
As already mentioned, the Illinois Central grant had been made on
the express condition that "nothing herein contained shall authorize obstructions to the Chicago harbor, or impair the public right
of navigation. ' 59 Field protested that this clause "placed no impediments upon the action of the railroad company which did not previously exist," 60 but that only made the dissenters' point stronger:
even apart from the explicit limitation, the state had not attempted to abandon protection of navigation."'
The Court had already held, building upon a dictum by Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck, that a state could not contract away its
authority to regulate under the police power.2 It had done so,

Wall.) 713 (1866); D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 10 (discussing Gilman and related cases).
The closest Field could come to real precedent was a dictum in an opinion signed by one of
three participating New Jersey justices but attributed by Field without apparent embarrassment to "the Supreme Court of New Jersey." Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (1822) (opinion of Kirkpatrick, C.J.), quoted in Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 456.
11 146 U.S. at 464-76 (citing, inter alia, Langdon v. Mayor of New York, 93 N.Y. 129
(1883)). Field responded that general statements in these decisions affirming such power
should be "read and construed with reference to the special facts of the particular cases,"
that no grant as extensive as the one before him had ever been sustained, and that the state
could convey only "such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public" (e.g.,
for the construction of piers), "or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of
the public interest in the lands and waters remaining." 146 U.S. at 453. Even if this served
to distinguish the dissenters' cases, it left the majority devoid of authority of its own. Even
the foremost modern proponent of the public-trust doctrine does not argue that Illinois
Central was supported by precedent. See Sax, supra note 52, at 489-91. For a somewhat
more sympathetic view, see Selvin, The Public Trust Doctrine in American Law and Economic Policy, 1789-1920, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 1403, 1435.
5 146 U.S. at 452-54.
48 People v. New York & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 79-80 (1877).
59 146 U.S. at 406 n.1.
60 Id. at 451.
6 It was also apparent from West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 531-32
(1848), that, in making the grant, the state had implicitly reserved the power to retake the
land itself for public use upon payment of just compensation. See D. CURRIE, supra note 28,
ch. 7 (discussing Dix).
61 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1880); cf. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
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under Field's leadership, with as little concern for the state constitution in question as Field exhibited in Illinois Central. But in the
Illinois case Field pulled out all the stops in a creative effort to
extend the precedents, contrary to Marshall's distinction, 3 to a
case in which the state had parted only with ownership and not
with governmental power, and in which the terms of the grant itself protected the public interest with which the opinion was
concerned.
Thirteen years later, in its last significant encounter with the
contract clause, the Fuller Court in Manigault v. Springs64 rendered yet another narrow interpretation, upholding a state law authorizing one proprietor to flood another's land despite a preexisting contract in which he had promised not to do so. 6 5 The police

power, wrote Justice Brown, was "paramount to any rights under
contracts between individuals. . .

[P]arties by entering into con-

tracts may not estop the legislature from enacting laws intended
for the public good." 6 In addition to several inapposite precedents
construing particular contracts not to contain promises inconsistent with later legislation, 7 Brown relied on the more nearly relevant decision in Stone v. Mississippi" that a state could not contract away its police power. But no state promise was in issue in
Manigault, and to hold that private contracts were implicitly subject to modification whenever required by the police power6 9 was
87, 135 (1810) (one legislature is always competent to repeal the general legislation of a prior
legislature). For discussion of Fletcher and Stone, see D. CURRIE, supra note 28, chs. 5, 11.
'3 In Fletcher, Marshall emphasized that a legislature may repeal the general acts of a
prior legislature but that a specific sale of land, made on legislative authorization, was an act
that could not be "undo[ne]" by a subsequent legislature. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 135.
- 199 U.S. 473 (1905) (Brown, J.).
'" Since the statute provided for payment of compensation, 199 U.S. at 486, the Court
could have reached this result on the basis of precedents construing sales of government
land to individuals as containing an implicit reservation of the power of eminent domain.
See West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 531-32 (1848). But that was not the
basis of the Court's decision. See Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pt.
2), 57 HARV. L. REv. 621, 674 (1944).
11 199 U.S. at 480. Justice Holmes made a better known statement to the same effect in
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908): "One whose rights.., are
subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a
contract about them." This statement was quite unnecessary to the decision, since the contract in question had been made after a law prohibiting such contracts had been passed; as
Holmes said, the contract "was illegal when it was made," id. at 357.
'7 See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 548-49 (1837)
(statutory charter granted to one bridge company contains no implicit promise not to grant
subsequent charter to another bridge company), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch.
7.
68 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1880), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 11.
09 It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the obli-
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perilously close to saying that states could impair contractual obligations whenever they had a good reason.70 A narrow interpretation of the scope of proper police-power measures might have
avoided reading the contract clause out of the Constitution alto72
gether, 71 but Manigault was at best a life-threatening precedent.
As one might expect after these decisions, the once mighty
contract clause played very little part in striking down state laws
during the Fuller period.a

gation of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are
vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general
good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may
thereby be affected.
Manigault, 199 U.S. at 480. For a discussion of the difference between public and private
contracts in this context, see Hale, supra note 65, at 671.
70 That would be enough to sustain the debtor-relief legislation that had prompted the
clause to begin with. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 204 (1819) (discussing original purpose of the contract clause).
7' See B. WRIGHT, supra note 55, at 211-12 (construing cases to limit contract-affecting
police power measures to subject matter of "unusual public importance").
7' A few years earlier, the Fuller Court had dealt a similar blow to yet another constitutional provision designed to protect the expectations of creditors-the prohibition in article
I, section 10 of the issuance by states of bills of credit. Houston & T.C.R.R. v. Texas, 177
U.S. 66 (1900) (Peckham, J.). The challenged notes were "treasury warrants" issued to state
creditors in small denominations and promising future payment. Since the Court had long
ago drawn a shaky but necessary line between promissory notes and bills of credit, the notes
in Houston & T.C.R.R. may have been sustainable on the basis of precedent. See Craig v.
Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410, 432-34 (1830), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 6. In
upholding the validity of the treasury warrants, however, the Court laid principal stress on
its conclusion that they had not been "intended to circulate as money" because "the members of the legislature knew that to issue the warrants to circulate as money would be to
condemn them from the start"; it was immaterial that the legislature "may have desired to
facilitate the[ir] use" among private persons by agreeing also to accept them in satisfaction
of obligations to the state. Houston & T.C.R.R., 177 U.S. at 84. As Justice Brown protested
in a separate opinion, this seemed to invite the states to evade the prohibition by a simple
exercise in labeling. See id. at 102-03 (Brown, J., concurring in the Court's alternative
ground that the state was estopped to deny the validity of its own warrants).
73 For an attempt to explain this phenomenon, see Kainen, Nineteenth Century Interpretations of the Federal Contract Clause: The Transformation from Vested to Substantive Rights Against the State, 31 BuFrALo L. REv. 381 (1982).
Approximately 250 contract-clause cases were decided during Fuller's tenure; in fewer
than 10% of them was state action found unconstitutional. Over 90% of the contract-clause
cases involved public contracts, and a great many of them concerned the interpretation of
particular tax exemptions. Only two not yet mentioned are of interest. One was Crenshaw v.
United States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890) (Lamar, J.), which allowed the United States to discharge
a naval officer before his term, not on the obvious ground that the contract clause applied
only to the states, but because of precedents holding that public officers' agreements were
not "contracts" within the meaning of the clause, id. at 108; see, e.g., Butler v. Pennsylvania, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 402, 416 (1851), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 7. The
other was Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488 (1897) (Harlan, J.), which declared that the
Supreme Court was free to disregard state-court decisions upholding state authority to
make irrevocable grants of lottery privileges, id. at 499-500. Harlan, for the Court, relied
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FEDERAL POWER TO PROTECT ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Fuller's accession to the Court essentially coincided with Congress's first major attempts-in the Interstate Commerce and
Sherman Acts-to combat perceived abuses of private economic
power. Fuller and his brethren, as we shall see, would have ample
opportunities to pass upon the scope of federal authority to do
this. But federal power was also exercised during this time to protect private economic interests, and from the first the Fuller Court
construed federal authority broadly to permit such protection.
A. The Power to Exclude Aliens
The first example was Justice Field's 1889 opinion for a unanimous Court in the Chinese Exclusion Case,7 4 which upheld a federal statute barring the entry of Chinese laborers into the country.
Underlying the enactment of this law, as Field observed, was the
75
increasing competition between Chinese and American workers.
Acknowledging that denying reentry to individuals who had once
lawfully resided in the United States was inconsistent with an earlier treaty, the Court properly invoked precedent indicating that
treaties, like statutes, were vulnerable to later contrary congressional action.76 The argument that the legislation impaired a
vested right represented by a reentry certificate issued when the
immigrant had left this country was rejected on grounds familiar
from contract-clause jurisprudence: Congress had no power to
promise not to exercise its legislative authority.7 7 Most interesting,
however, was the ground on which Justice Field defended his cenlargely on cases reexamining state-court decisions that had denied the existence of a contract, although the Court in such cases had done so to prevent states from evading the
contract clause; this consideration is absent when the state court has upheld the contract.
See D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 7 (discussing the Court's approach to such a case in Piqua
Branch of State Bank v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369, 391-92 (1854)). Harlan added, as the
Court had said in Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1880), that lottery contracts were
not within the clause at all. Douglas, 168 U.S. at 504. Support for that interpretation was
wanting, however, and most of the Stone opinion had dealt with the state's power to contract, which ought to have turned on state law. See D. CURRIE supra note 28, ch. 11; id. ch. 6
(discussing Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827)).
" 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
75 Id. at 594-95.
16Id. at 600-03 (citing, inter alia, The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884)).
7 130 U.S. at 609; cf. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1880) ("IT]he legislature
cannot bargain away the police power of a State."), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28,
ch. 11. The Court might have added that there seemed to be no consideration for the promise to readmit and that in any event the contract clause was inapplicable to the United
States.
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tral proposition-he argued that the exclusion of aliens was among
the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution.
A commerce-clause argument would have been entirely plausible. Marshall had established in Gibbons v. Ogden7 s that the transportation of persons was commerce, and the Court had struck
down state laws excluding aliens on the ground that they encroached upon Congress's power over foreign commerce. 79 Field
elected instead to find the power inherent in sovereignty, in the
teeth of Marshall's confirmation of the well-understood principle
that the federal government was one of enumerated powers: s°
Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident
of every independent nation ...
While under our Constitution . . .the great mass of local
matters is controlled by local authorities, the United States,
in their relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens are one nation, invested with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for
the maintenance of its absolute independence and security
throughout its entire territory.8 1
These observations were reminiscent of equally unnecessary arguments about the "inherent" powers of Congress previously made
by Justice Miller in two cases involving domestic federal author22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 6.
See, e.g., Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 272 (1876), discussed in D.
CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 12; cf. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 600 (1884) (upholding, on the basis of the commerce power, a charge on alien immigrants), discussed in D.
CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 13; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (in
reaffirming Field's conclusion in the Chinese Exclusion Case, Justice Gray appeared to rest
congressional power to exclude aliens largely on the commerce clause); LAURENCE TRIBE,
79
71

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 5-16, at 277 (1978) (relating the power over aliens to Con-

gress's authority "[t]o establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization" under art. I, § 8); Hesse,
The ConstitutionalStatus of the Lawfully Admitted PermanentResident Alien: The Pre1917 Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 1578, 1582-1609 (1959) (exploring other possible sources, including
the war powers). For discussion of the due process question also resolved in the Nishimura
case, see infra note 301.
80 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819), discussed in D. CURRIE,
supra note 28, ch. 6.
"1 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 603-04. For a recent criticism of this reasoning, see Note, ConstitutionalLimits on the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
957, 967 (1982). By emphasizing other passages of the opinion describing the power over
aliens as one "delegated" to Congress, e.g., 130 U.S. at 609, one observer has argued that the
Court must have intended to rely on the commerce clause and that the passage quoted in
the text "related not to the question of the extent of constitutional power over the people,
but rather to the power under international law." Hesse, supra note 79, at 1590. This reading seems an exercise in wishful thinking.
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ity, 2 neither of which was cited,"3 and they presaged the much
later and more famous dicta of Justice Sutherland about foreignaffairs powers in the Curtiss-Wright case.8 4 Three years after the
Chinese Exclusion Case, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, Justice Gray extended the inherent-powers concept to include authority to deport aliens,"5 which seems harder to fit within the enumerated commerce power: when an alien is resident in this country, he
is not part of any "intercourse" with a foreign nation."8 In the context of Asian immigration, the Court could certainly not be described as grudging in its interpretation of the scope of federal
87
authority.

82

United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1886) (upholding congressional

power to punish crimes committed by Indians on the basis of "the right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the National Government, and can be found nowhere else"); Ex
parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 666 (1884) ("waste of time" to look for specific constitutional source of Congress's inherent power to pass laws protecting the right to vote); see D.
CURRIE, supra note 28, chs. 11, 13 (discussing Kagama and Yarbrough).
83 Heavy reliance was placed instead on diplomatic correspondence, much of it irrelevantly recognizing the right of such countries as France or Mexico to exclude aliens without
regard to the ticklish federalism issue raised by our own Constitution. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 607-08.
84 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). The opposing arguments respecting inherent or enumerated powers had been rehearsed in congressional debates on the notorious Alien Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 570. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 195471, 1973-2006 (1851). Field dismissed the relevance of these debates on the unconvincing
ground that the 1798 statute had contained provisions going beyond the mere exclusion of
aliens. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 610-11.
- 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893). Brewer, Field, and Fuller dissented. For' the procedural
issues raised by this case, see infra note 301.
86 See 2 C. WARREN, supra note 29, at 696 (terming Fong Yue Ting an "extreme decision" that "seemed to justify the old Alien Law of 1798"). The Court later drew the line at
Congress's attempt to punish a citizen for harboring an alien prostitute, concluding that it
was not within Congress's power "to control all the dealings of our citizens with resident
aliens." Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 148 (1909) (Brewer, J.). Holmes, joined by
Harlan and Moody, dissented, employing a very liberal test of the relation between legislative means and the legitimate end of regulating immigration. Id. at 150.
87 Very much in the spirit of the cases about Chinese and Japanese aliens was the dissenting argument of Chief Justice Fuller, joined by the famed civil libertarian Harlan, that
children born in this country to Chinese alien parents were not American citizens. United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898) (dissenting opinion). At his most pedantic, Gray took some fifty pages to show for the majority that the law in most of the world
was what the fourteenth amendment rather clearly said was our own: "All persons born...
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States . . . ." Id. at 702. As Gray said, the natural meaning of this phrase had been confirmed by Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886), which had held that aliens residing
in this country were "within [the] jurisdiction" of a state for purposes of the equal protection clause. 169 U.S. at 696. Fuller's best argument was the presumption, supported by two
comments made in the debates over the fourteenth amendment, that the amendment was
meant to embody the citizenship provision of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which had excluded
persons "subject to any foreign power." Id. at 719-22. Gray responded that the language of
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Delegation of Legislative Power

In 1892, in Field v. Clark,"' the Court gave a broad reading to
federal executive power in upholding another measure designed to
protect American economic interests. The Tariff Act of 189089 had
authorized the President to suspend the free importation of certain
goods from any country that he found had imposed "reciprocally
unequal and unreasonable" duties on American products. If he did
so, a specified tariff schedule would apply.
The problem here was not one of federalism, as in the alien
cases, but one of the separation of powers between the President
and Congress. Justice Lamar put the objection on the right constitutional peg in a separate opinion joined by Chief Justice Fuller:
article I vested the legislative power in Congress,9" and that meant
that Congress could not transfer legislative authority to anyone
else. 1 This, Lamar concluded, was what Congress had done: the

the amendment was different, cited contrary legislative history, and added the striking assertion that the debates were "not admissible. . . to control the meaning" of the text. Id. at
688, 698-99. Ironically, it had been Gray who had denied, and Harlan who had supported,
citizenship for the children of American Indian tribesmen in the last previous controversy
over the meaning of this provision. See D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 11 (discussing Elk v.
Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)).
88 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
88 26 Stat. 567, 612 (1890).
So U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States... ."); id. § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises . .
").
" Field, 143 U.S. at 697 (Lamar, J., concurring in the judgment). Since article I speaks
only of federal legislative power, it was not surprising that the Court has doubted whether
the Constitution limits delegations of state legislative authority at all. See Dreyer v. Illinois,
187 U.S. 71, 83-84 (1902) (Harlan, J.) (fourteenth amendment due process clause does not
require the separation of state powers). The due process argument, however, was not easily
dispatched. The developing notion that due process required whatever the Court might
think appropriate, see infra notes 302-44 and accompanying text (discussing Smyth v.
Ames, Allgeyer v. Louisiana, and Lochner v. New York), gave some support to the argument. More substantial support could also be found in the historical association of the
clause with Magna Charta's law-of-the-land requirement, which was clearly designed to preclude executive action without legal sanction-and thus arguably, like article I itself, to require that basic policy decisions be made by the lawmakers. See D. CURRIE, supra note 28,
ch. 8 (discussing Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)). For cases of the Fuller
period upholding state laws over delegation objections, see Ohio ex rel. Lloyd v. Dollison,
194 U.S. 445, 450 (1904) (McKenna, J.) (even "if a case can exist in which the kind or degree
of power given by a State to its tribunals may become an element of due process," a statute
need not define such "well known terms" as "wholesale" and "retail" to avoid delegation
problem); St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U.S. 203, 210-12 (1902) (Brown, J.)
(allowing "detail[s]" of mine inspections to be left to an executive, citing Field and The Brig
Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 387-88 (1813), without addressing the fact that article I is
inapplicable to the states).
In Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Powers, 201 U.S. 245, 294 (1906) (Brewer, J.) (dictum), how-
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statute "extends to the executive the exercise of those discretionary powers which the Constitution has vested in the law-making
department."92
There are contexts in which those invested with authority may
lawfully delegate it to others.93 As influential a writer as Locke,
however, had denied that the legislative power was thus delegable.94 Moreover, although the President, in suspending importation
in Field, was merely executing a legislative command, indifference
to the breadth of discretion left to the executive would run afoul of
the accepted wisdom that the framers placed legislative power in
Congress in order to assure that fundamental policy decisions be
made by the elected representatives of the people. 95 Accordingly,
the majority, speaking through Justice Harlan, conceded without
discussion Lamar's formidable premise that the substance of legislative power could not be delegated. 6
In the majority's view, however, there had been no such delegation in Field. Congress, said Harlan, had made the decision that
tariffs should be imposed against any country that charged uneever, the Court left open the question whether a grant of state legislative power to the executive or judiciary might "work an abandonment of a republican form of Government, or be
a denial of due process, or equal protection." The relevance of equal protection, despite
suggestive precedent, seems doubtful. See D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 11 (discussing Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). Further, the Court had not displayed much eagerness
to enforce the article IV, section 4 guarantee of "a Republican Form of Government." See D.
CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 8 (discussing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849)); see
also Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 578 (1900) (Fuller, C.J.) (alternative holding) (rejecting a guarantee-clause attack on a state legislature's resolution of a contest for governor
with the sweeping observation that Luther had "settled that the enforcement of this guarantee belonged to the political department").
92 Field, 143 U.S. at 699-700.
11 As early as 1839, the Court had sustained the authority of a President to delegate to
his subordinates a congressional authorization to reserve public lands. Wilcox v. Jackson, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 513 (1839). Compare the modern trend of allowing trustees to delegate
more authority to financial advisers. See Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and TrustInvestment Law, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1, 18-24.
9' JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government ch. XI, § 141, in Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT (London 1690).
9"See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 22 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (Congress created on assumption "that enactment of this free country's laws could be safely entrusted
[only] to the representatives of the people"); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963)
(Harlan, J., dissenting in part) (anti-delegation principle ensures that "fundamental policy
decisions" will be made "by the body immediately responsible to the people"); ALEXANDER
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 160-61 (1962) (objection to delegation rests largely
on notion that the more fundamental the decision, the more democracy requires it to be
made by an electorally accountable body); Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative
Power (pt. 1), 47 COLUM. L. REV. 359, 360 (1947) ("[T]he objection to indiscriminate and indefined delegation ... expresses a fundamental democratic concern.").

9'Field, 143 U.S. at 692.
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qual and unreasonable duties, and Congress had specified what
tariffs should be imposed. The President's only authority was to
"ascertain[] the fact" that unequal and unreasonable duties were
being exacted. In so doing he was not making law; 'he was acting
"in execution of the act of Congress. '9 7 The case was thus gov-

erned by The Brig Aurora98 in which the Marshall Court had

unanimously upheld a statute empowering the President to revive
an embargo against England or France upon finding that the other
country had "cease[d] to violate the neutral commerce of the
United States."9 9 Adding an impressive list of statutory precedents
dating back to 1794, Harlan concluded that such a longstanding
"practical construction" by Congress "should not be overruled, unless upon a conviction that such legislation was clearly incompatible with the supreme law of the land." 10 0
Lamar was on sound ground in objecting that it was harder to
classify the President's job as mere fact-finding in Field than it
had been in The Brig Aurora,1 01 since the unreasonableness of a
tariff seems less subject to objective verification than the infringement of neutrality.10 2 Indeed, the neutrality question itself had involved a good deal of independent judgment; the Court's effort to
describe the President's duties as ministerial in either case was
unconvincing.
Harlan would have done better to argue that the President's
power to execute the laws 0 8 historically and necessarily included
more than mere fact-finding. No legislature can be expected to
specify how its policy decisions are to be applied to every conceiva97Id. at 692-93.
9S 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388 (1813), discussed in Field, 143 U.S. at 682-83; see D.
CURRIE, supra note 28, chs. 4, 6.
9 Act of Mar. 1, 1809, § 11, 2 Stat. 528, 530-31.
100 Field, 143 U.S. at 683-92. Lamar responded, without supporting argument, that the
legislative precedents were distinguishable, id. at 700, but they appeared to be squarely in
point. His technically accurate protest that the precedents did not bind the Court, id.,
hardly reflected the Court's established and persuasive practice of giving enactments by
early Congresses considerable weight as evidence of the original constitutional understanding. See D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 4 (discussing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304 (1816)); id. ch. 6 (discussing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819)).
101 Field, 143 U.S. at 698-700.
101 See Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power (pt. 2), 47 COLUM L. REv.
561, 562, 566 (1947) (exercise of judgment in The Brig Aurora "slight"; in Field "wide and
uncertain").
1o "He. . .shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed ..
"U.S. CONsT. art.

II, § 3.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[52:324

ble fact situation,0 4 and the framers cannot be thought to have
demanded the impossible. The patent law of 1790 left it to the
executive to determine whether an invention was "sufficiently useful and important" to merit protection; 0 5 the 1795 law authorizing
the President to call out the troops left it to him to determine
whether or not there was an "imminent danger" of invasion. 10 6 To
label such determinations as merely factual is to obscure the reality that enforcing the laws implies a healthy portion of interstitial
policymaking. 0 7 Twelve years after Field, in Buttfield v. Stranahan,10 the Court upheld a delegation to the executive of authority
to prescribe "standards of purity, quality and fitness for consumption" of imported tea. 09 Justice White, for a unanimous Court, recast the test in more realistic terms:
[T]he statute, when properly construed. . . but expresses the
purpose to exclude the lowest grades of tea. . . .This, in ef-

fect, was the fixing of a primary standard, and devolved upon
the Secretary of the Treasury the mere executive duty to effectuate the legislative policy declared in the statute ...
Congress legislated on the. subject as far as was reasonably
practicable, and from the necessities of the case was compelled to leave to executive officials the duty of bringing about
the result pointed out by the statute." 0
White's insistence that executive discretion must be interstitial seems a fair reconciliation of executive necessity with the primacy of legislative policymaking. Judged by this unavoidably slippery standard, the embargo provision in The Brig Aurora was not
hard to uphold. Not only had Congress, as in Field, specified exactly what was to be done; it had provided the President with an
intelligible yardstick to apply in deciding whether to do it, for
there was a long history of international practice to help define
"' It was on this ground that Locke, who held that legislative power could not be delegated, embraced an even broader conception of executive power than that here suggested. J.
LocKS, supra note 94, ch. XIV, § 160 (executive "prerogative" to act for public good even in
absence of legal authority).
"' Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793).
'o Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, § 1, 1 Stat. 424, 424; see Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 19, 29-31 (1827) (holding the President sole judge of a sufficient danger under the
Act). Additional early examples of delegations by Congress are given in 1 KENNETH CULP
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATE LAW TREATISE § 3:4 (2d ed. 1978).
107 See Jaffe, supra note 95, at 360 ("[E]very statute is a delegation of lawmaking
power to the agency appointed to enforce it.").

108 192 U.S. 470 (1904).

109Act of Mar. 2, 1897, § 3, 29 Stat. 604, 605.
110 192 U.S. at 496.
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what Congress had in mind."' Field and Buttfield seem to have
been harder cases, for the Court did not make clear whether there
were comparable traditions to confine the executive in determining
"unreasonable" tariffs or "the lowest grades" of tea." 2 Even if
there were no confining traditions, the Court retained control over
future delegations by emphasizing that Congress had made the basic policy decision to protect the producer from hostile tariffs and
the consumer from unpalatable brew. Nevertheless, the breadth of
the discretion apparently conferred in both cases showed that the
Fuller Court was not prepared to fetter federal protection of American interests by narrowly construing the executive power in the
name of protecting legislative prerogatives from the legislature
itself. 13
C. The Common Law
Probably more striking than either the alien or the delegation
"I See, e.g., VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATiONS, bk. III, ch. VII (anon. trans. Philadelphia

1829) (1st French ed. London 1758) (discussing the principles of neutrality under the law of
nations).
"' See Jaffe, supra note 102, at 566-67 (finding Buttfield "a much easier case" than
Field because "the settled judgment of the [tea] trade" was available to guide the
administrator).
"' Other Fuller Court cases rejecting delegation arguments include Franklin v. United
States, 216 U.S. 559, 568-69 (1910) (Fuller, C.J.) (upholding a statute incorporating existing
state laws to define federal crimes on federal enclaves within the states: "There is, plainly,
no delegation to the States of authority in any way to change the criminal laws applicable to
places over which the United States has jurisdiction."); St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Taylor,
210 U.S. 281, 287 (1908) (Day, J.) (relying on Buttfield without elaboration to uphold a
delegation to a private association of power to determine the permissible height of railway
couplers under federal law); United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S. 370, 384-85 (1907)
(White, J.) (holding, on the basis of inapposite precedent and without further explanation,
that Congress could delegate to the President general legislative authority over the Philippine Islands); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 385-87 (1907) (Harlan, J.)
(upholding a statute empowering the executive to order removal of "unreasonable obstructions" to navigation as authorizing him only to ascertain "the facts" to determine "what
particular cases came within the rule prescribed by Congress"); Butte City Water Co. v.
Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 126 (1905) (Brewer, J.) (upholding a statute leaving it to the states to
make "minor and subordinate regulations" respecting mining claims on federal land and
noting that the context was "not of a legislative character in the highest sense of the term"
but "savors somewhat of mere rules prescribed by an owner of property for its disposal"); In
re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526, 532-33 (1897) (Fuller, C.J.) (upholding a statute forbidding sales of
margarine except in packages "marked, stamped, and branded as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. . .shall prescribe" on the ground that the statute left to the Commissioner
"a mere matter of detail.. . in execution of.. .the law"); Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129
U.S. 141, 147 (1889) (Fuller, C.J.) (upholding delegation of lawmaking power to the local
legislature of the District of Columbia: "[T]he creation of municipalities exercising local
self-government" was sanctioned by "immemorial practice" notwithstanding general rule
against delegation of legislative power).
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cases was the broad scope the Court afforded to federal executive
and judicial powers in the 1895 case of In re Debs,114 in which Justice Brewer, for a unanimous Court, upheld the power of a federal
court to enjoin, at executive request, the obstruction of interstate
rail traffic during the great Pullman strike of 1894. The subject was
federal, Brewer intoned, because article I gave Congress authority
to regulate commerce among the states. Since Congress had "assumed jurisdiction" over interstate railroads by passing several
laws to regulate them, it was the duty of the federal executive to
keep them free from interference. As in the case of any other public nuisance, this executive power included the right not only to
abate the obstruction by force but also to seek appropriate judicial
relief.11
To modern eyes, what may be most startling about Debs is the
Court's failure to identify the source of the law on which the injunction was based. Presidents have constitutional power to enforce the laws, 1"6 but not to make them-as Justice Black later emphasized. when President Truman seized the steel mills to assure
military supply. 117 Brewer nowhere argued that Congress had prohibited private obstructions to interstate rail traffic.
The invocation of public-nuisance cases suggests that the injunction was based upon judge-made law. Only seven years earlier,
however, in refusing to allow a federal injunction against a bridge
14 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
15 Id. at 579-86. The Court also invoked Congress's authority to "establish Post Offices
and post Roads," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,and held that the sixth amendment jury guarantee
had not been violated since equity traditionally could enjoin crimes when the legal remedy
was inadequate to prevent irreparable harm, 158 U.S. at 594-96. Much of the vigorous criticism of Debs centered on this question. See, e.g., Lewis, A Protest Against Administering
CriminalLaw by Injunction-The Debs' Case, 33 AM. L. REG. (n.s.) 879, 881 (1894); Patterson, Government by Injunction, 3 VA. L. REG. 625, 628 (1898). For an approving view, see A.
McLAUGHLIN, supra note 29, at 766 n.10 ("[Tihe mere fact that an act is criminal does not
divest the jurisdiction of equity to prevent it by injunction.").
"'
U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 3.
11 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1952). See also Justice Jackson's insistence, concurring in this conclusion, id. at 640-41, that the reference to
"executive Power" in article II vests the President with only those powers thereafter listed;
the President, like Congress, possesses only enumerated powers. These statements went beyond the needs of the case since the majority found that Congress had implicitly prohibited
the seizure. Id. at 586. Compare In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63-68 (1890) (alternative holding),
an uncharacteristically wordy Miller opinion affirming the broad doctrine that the President's duty to execute the laws entitled him to assign an officer to protect a Supreme Court
Justice from physical assault while on duty, even absent statutory authorization to do so.
See 2 C. WARREN, supra note 29, at 697 ("This was the broadest interpretation yet given to
implied powers of the National Government . . . ."). Neagle had been prosecuted by the
State of California for having murdered an assailant of Justice Field. For the lurid facts, see
Neagle, 135 U.S. at 42-53; C. SWISHER, supra note 1, at 345-59.
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that interfered with interstate and foreign shipping, the Court had
unanimously held that "there is no common law of the United
States which prohibits obstructions and nuisances in navigable rivers . . . . - That case might have been distinguished by arguing
that the grant of jurisdiction in cases to which the United States
was a party, like that in admiralty cases, 119 gave the courts authority to make law in the face of legislative silence. 20 Yet the Court
made no effort either to do so or to distinguish the longstanding
precedents holding the federal courts to be without authority to
punish nonstatutory crimes even when the United States was prosecutor. 2 ' If Brewer meant that the federal executive had authority
to enforce state common law,1 22 he never said so. Neither did he
examine the law of any particular state, as this theory would seem
to require, nor explain why the President's enforcement authority
was not limited to federal laws.12
18 Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 8 (1888). Debs relied on Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1852), see Debs, 158 U.S. at
588, but as the Court said in Willamette, 125 U.S. at 15-16, Wheeling had been based on
the violation of federal statutes and of an interstate compact, sanctioned by Congress, to
preserve free navigation of the Ohio River.
"I' See infra note 245.
"0 The Court has often found authority to create common law in such cases, though
not explicitly on this ground. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363,
366-67 (1943) ("The rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which it
issues are governed by federal rather than local law .... In the absence of an applicable act
of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their
own standards."). The Fuller Court itself expressly held that the arguably analogous grant
of jurisdiction over suits between states contemplated the application of federal common
law. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97-98 (1907) (Brewer, J.) (noting that the Court could
not appropriately apply the law of either state to resolve a contest between them); Missouri
v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 519-20 (1906) (Holmes, J.) (where Congress has provided no substantive law, grant of original jurisdiction to Supreme Court implies Court is to select applicable legal principles). For an approving contemporaneous view, see 21 HARv. L. REv. 132
(1907). On the question of federal common law in Debs, see 73 HARv. L. REv. 1228 (1960).
1" See United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); see also D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 4 (discussing
Hudson and Coolidge). Brewer might have argued that the presence of admiralty jurisdiction in Coolidge showed that the difficulty was peculiar to criminal cases, but he did not.
"'
This possibility, which was present in the interstate case of Wheeling Bridge, had
been unavailable in Willamette, where jurisdiction had been based only on the argued existence of a federal common law of nuisance, see Willamette, 125 U.S. at 15; supra note 118.
123 At one point, the opinion seemed to flirt with the suggestion that the commerce
clause itself forbade the strikers' activities: "If a State with its recognized powers of sovereignty is impotent to obstruct interstate commerce, can it be that any mere voluntary association of individuals within the limits of that State has a power which the State itself does
not possess?" Debs, 158 U.S. at 581. The radical implication that constitutional provisions
limit private as well as official action, theretofore recognized only in respect to the rather
unambiguous thirteenth amendment, comports poorly with the language and history of a
provision dividing regulatory authority between nation and states, and Brewer did not de-
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Thus, in the alien cases, the Fuller Court allowed Congress to
exercise authority without arguing that it was necessary and
proper to any of the enumerated powers. In Field v. Clark, it allowed Congress to leave to the President a broad range of judgment in determining whether federal taxing power should be asserted. In Debs, it allowed the executive and the courts to protect
federal interests in the absence of any relevant legislation.'24 In
short, when the protection of economic interests was at stake, the
Court was anything but miserly in its interpretation of federal
125
power.
III.

FEDERAL POWER TO IMPAIR ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Despite the cases considered in the preceding section, the
Fuller Court was by no means uniformly sympathetic to the exercise of federal authority. Indeed, among the decisions for which it
is best remembered are two debatably narrow interpretations of
federal power rendered in the same Term as Debs: its holding that
the Sherman Act did not apply to the sugar trust and its invalidation of the income tax.
A.

United States v. E.C. Knight Co.

The complaint in the first case sought to undo acquisitions
that had given one manufacturer all but two percent of the sugar
market, on the ground that they constituted a "combination...
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States" and a
monopolization of such trade. 126 Chief Justice Fuller's answer for
velop it. If he had, he might have had difficulty explaining why the Court had held that the
equal protection clause did not outlaw private discrimination. See The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 11.
The Court in Debs expressly declined to treat the United States simply as proprietor of
the mails suing to protect its property rights. The decision was based in substantial part on
the sovereign interest in preventing obstructions to commerce. 158 U.S. at 583-86.
12, See also Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 371-72 (1893) (Brewer, J.) (applying the rule of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842), discussed in D. CURRIE,
supra note 28, ch. 8, to hold, over an impassioned dissent by Justice Field, that the scope of
the fellow-servant rule in a diversity case was governed by the "general law," despite the
Rules of Decision Act, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789)). For a defense of Field's position, based on the
perception that Swift had held an action under the law merchant not to be a "trial[] at
common law" within the Rules of Decision Act, see Conant, The Commerce Clause, the
Supremacy Clause and the Law Merchant: Swift v. Tyson and the Unity of Commercial
Law, 15 J. MAR. L. & Cons 153, 158-59 (1984).
125But see BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 91
(1942) (the more legislation tended to threaten laissez-faire economics, the less liberal was
the Court's interpretation of legislative power).
I" Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1, 2, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
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the majority was straightforward: manufacturing was not commerce, so the statute did not reach its monopolization. 127 This conclusion was supported with authority of constitutional dimension.
The Court had already held that the commerce clause did not prevent state regulation of liquor manufacture, on the express ground
12 8
that commerce began only after manufacture was completed.
The distinction between manufacturing and commerce was
fair enough. Nevertheless, as Justice Harlan protested in a lonely
dissent, the complaint did not attack the monopolization of manufacturing as such but rather the concomitant monopolization of interstate sales. 12 9 By eliminating competition among manufacturers,
Harlan argued, the acquisitions had obstructed "freedom in buying
and selling articles manufactured to be sold to persons in other
States," and "Congress may remove unlawful obstructions, of
whatever kind, to the free course of trade among the States." '
The necessary and proper clause, which Harlan invoked"31 and
the majority ignored, lent him additional support. As construed by
Marshall,13 2 the clause seems to mean that Congress may regulate
what is not itself interstate commerce in order to effectuate the
framers' purpose of protecting commerce from interference. In§§

1, 2 (1982)).
M United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895).
28 Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 21 (1888), quoted in E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 14; see

also McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1877) (commerce clause does not forbid
state regulation of oyster planting: "Commerce has nothing to do with land while producing,
but only with the product after it has become the subject of trade."). The Court in E.C.
Knight also relied on Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 527 (1886) (commerce clause does not
prohibit a state tax on logs intended for interstate shipment but not yet shipped). 156 U.S.
at 13-14.
2 E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 34 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 3-4 (reporter's
summary of averments in complaint); Guy, The Anti-Monopoly Act: A Review of the Decisions Affecting It, 1 VA. L. REG. 709, 719 (1896) (calling attention to the lower court's finding, see 156 U.S. at 6, that "[t]he object in purchasing the Philadelphia refineries was to
obtain a greater influence or more perfect control over the business of refining and selling
sugar in this country"); Morawetz, The Supreme Court and the Anti-Trust Act, 10 COLUh.
L. REv. 687, 706 (1910) ("The only constitutional question was whether Congress could prohibit the purchase of control of competitive businesses . . .when the purpose or effect of
the transaction was to monopolize interstate commerce . .
").
220 156 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., dissenting). But see G. SHIRAs, supra note 29, at 147
(arguing that the government neglected to present available evidence as to the effect on
interstate sales); 2 C. WARREN, supra note 29, at 733 (blaming the decision on "the unfortunate manner in which the facts were alleged and proved"); cf. McCurdy, The Knight Sugar
Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of American CorporationLaw, 1869-1903, 53 Bus.
HIST. REv. 304, 328 n.94 (1979) (arguing that the Court would have come out the same way
even if such evidence had been presented).
13, 156 U.S. at 39-40 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
M32
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420-21 (1819), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 6.
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deed, over fifty years before the sugar-trust case, the Taney Court,
in upholding a federal statute outlawing the theft of shipwrecked
goods, had expressly declared that the commerce power "extends
to such acts, done on land, which interfere with, obstruct, or prevent the due exercise of the power to regulate commerce and navigation.' 3 3 If stealing from commerce was subject to congressional
prohibition, it is difficult to see why monopolizing it was not. In
fact, within four years after E.C. Knight, the Court, in Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,134 unanimously upheld Congress's power to forbid an agreement among manufacturers not to
compete in interstate sales; the acquisition of competing sugar refineries in E.C. Knight eliminated competition for such sales more
3'
effectively than the agreement in Addyston Pipe."
Fuller protested that the effect of the sugar acquisitions on
commerce was "indirect. 13 6 Perhaps it was. 137 Behind this characterization, moreover, lay a legitimate concern. As Fuller said, if
every effect on interstate commerce were enough to trigger federal
authority, there would be nothing that Congress could not regulate, 38 and that result would contradict the careful enumeration of
limited congressional powers. 39 Yet Fuller's argument was unper133 United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 78 (1838), discussed
in D. CURRIE,
supra note 28, ch. 7. See also Fuller's own opinion for a unanimous Court in the Danbury
Hatters' Case (Loewe v. Lawlor), 208 U.S. 274, 301 (1908), which expressly held immaterial
the fact that union members charged with a boycott restraining interstate trade were "not
themselves engaged in interstate commerce." For an early argument invoking Coombs to
sustain congressional power over external restraints on commerce, see Humes, The Power of
Congress over Combinations Affecting Interstate Commerce, 17 HARV. L. REv. 83, 97 (1903).
By requiring only that the prohibited acts be "in restraint of" or "monopoliz[e]" interstate
commerce, the Sherman Act itself appeared to apply to actors not themselves in commerce.
134 175 U.S. 211, 240 (1899).
'" Fuller's objection in E.C. Knight that "[tihere was nothing in the proofs to indicate
any intention to put a restraint upon trade or commerce," 156 U.S. at 17, seems disingenuous, since the effect of the removal of competitors on competition could hardly have escaped
the parties. See id. at 43-44 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Intent also seems irrelevant to the
underlying constitutional issue since, even if the statute implicitly required intent, no reason
appears why Congress's power to protect commerce should be limited to the removal of
intentional obstructions.

136E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 16.

137 In Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 238-40, Justice Peckham relied on the "directness"
criterion in distinguishing E.C. Knight. It was fair enough to say that the effect on commerce of an agreement about sale prices was more immediate than that of an acquisition of
competing sellers. Just what "indirect" meant, however, was already in some doubt in the
wake of decisions upholding state laws impinging "indirectly" on commerce. See, e.g., Peik
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1877); Sherlock v. Ailing, 93 U.S. 99 (1876), discussed
in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 12.
138

E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 16.

Id. at 13. Recall Marshall's insistence in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 421 (1819), that the necessary and proper clause must be applied with an eye to the
3
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suasive, for he did not explain why the directness of the effect on
140
commerce was relevant to the scope of congressional authority.
The truth is that there was no logically convincing place to
draw the line.141 What logical extension of the necessary-andproper argument offends the spirit of enumerated powers is a question of degree, and thus any line the Court drew would very likely
have appeared arbitrary. 142 Nevertheless, E.C. Knight found a peculiar place to draw it, 4s and the Court's willingness to insulate a
manufacturing combination from congressional grasp144 contrasts
sharply with decisions upholding broad federal power to protect
American producers.14 5
"spirit" of the Constitution. See D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 6 (discussing McCulloch); see
also FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 103 (1961) ("[A]s
an exercise in ratiocination the commerce clause could absorb the states. But the purposes
of our federalism must be observed, and adjustments struck between state and nation.").
For one instance of failure to heed this counsel, see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
304 (1964) (upholding, on commerce clause grounds, a federal ban on racial discrimination
as applied to a restaurant, not shown to have served interstate travelers, on the basis of
Congress's finding that refusal to serve blacks reduced interstate food shipments to
restaurants).
"'0 See Farage, That Which "Directly" Affects Interstate Commerce, 42 DICK. L. REV.
1, 1-2 (1937).
4 A legislature may set eighteen years as the age at which a person is mature enough
to vote; a court would be embarrassed by its inability to distinguish the seventeen-year old.
Compare the Court's awkward distinction, under the fourteenth amendment, between juries
of five and six members in state criminal trials. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978)
(rejecting five-member juries); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970) (upholding sixmember juries).
4I THOMAS REED POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

34 (1956), argues that arbitrary lines may be better than none at all: "It may be better for
two cases to go in opposite directions than to have them both go in the same direction and
so tip that side of the scales."
14' See id. at 58 (branding the decision a "most unwarranted judicial offense" in
"par[ing the Sherman Act] down to the minimum that [its] language would warrant").
14 See McCurdy, supra note 130, at 308, 335-36 (arguing that far from representing the
triumph of laissez-faire, E.C. Knight was an effort to preserve state authority to act against
trusts despite the effect of the "dormant" commerce clause in limiting the states' authority
to regulate matters affecting interstate commerce).
1"5 See supra notes 74-113 and accompanying text. E.C. Knight also contrasts sharply
with United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 681 (1896) (Peckham, J.), in which
the Court unanimously upheld the construction of a monument to the Battle of Gettysburg
as necessary and proper to, inter alia, the power to raise armies, essentially because it would
instill feelings of patriotism that would make better soldiers in the future: "The greater the
love of the citizen for the institutions of his country the greater is the dependence properly
to be placed upon him for their defence in time of necessity . . . ." Id. at 682; see 2 C.
WARREN, supra note 29, at 706 (Gettysburg showed the Court's support for Congress's
power at its broadest). In Felsenheld v. United States, 186 U.S. 126, 132 (1902) (Brewer, J.),
moreover, the Court held, over Peckham's dissent, that Congress could forbid placing advertising coupons in tobacco packages bearing federal tax stamps for the flimsy reason that
people would take the stamp as a representation that the package contained only tobacco.
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B. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.
The second great 1895 decision narrowly interpreting congressional power, also written by Chief Justice Fuller, held the federal
income tax unconstitutional. 146 The principal ground was that the
tax was primarily a direct one not apportioned among the states by
population as required by sections 2 and 9 of article J.147
This conclusion must have caused great surprise. 14 Not only
had the Justices repeatedly suggested in dicta that only capitation
and taxes on land were "direct";1 49 twice in the preceding twentyfive years they had upheld income taxes, most recently on that
precise ground. 50 The dicta were dismissed as such in Pollock.1 51
The holdings were distinguished because one case had involved an
excise tax calculated according to income 52 and the other involved
a taxpayer whose income was derived essentially from professional
earnings, not property,15 3 though neither of these facts had been
offered as bases for the original decisions.
The tax in Pollock, Fuller noted, did apply to income from

With reasoning like this there seems little that could not be brought within congressional
authority.
14 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, modified on rehearing,158 U.S.
601 (1895) (invalidating Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, §§ 27-37, 28 Stat. 509, 553-60). The
first decision struck down the tax as applied to income from real property, 157 U.S. at 583,
and from state or municipal bonds, id. at 586. Harlan and White dissented on the former
point. Only eight Justices participated-Jackson was ill-and the Court was evenly divided
as to the validity of the tax in other respects, id. at 586. On rehearing, Jackson having been
roused from his sickbed for the last time, the statute was struck down in its entirety, 158
U.S. at 637, though Jackson joined Harlan, White, and Brown in dissent. There has been
much insignificant controversy over which Justice deserted the pro-tax forces between the
first and second decisions, since otherwise the addition of Jackson would have given them a
majority. See 2 C. WARREN, supra note 29, at 700 (saying it was Shiras); G. SHIRAS, supra
note 29, at 160-83 (denying it); W. KING, supra note 1, at 217-21 (adding that the Justices'
votes largely lined up with the per capita wealth of their home states; only Justice Brown of
Michigan joined three Southerners in voting to uphold the tax).
147 Pollock, 157 U.S. at 582-83; 158 U.S. at 637.
1'8 See F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 138, at 93 (decision in Pollock "unexpected[]"); A.
McLAUGHLIN, supra note 29, at 762-63 ("That the law would be upheld... appeared to be
a reasonable expectation. ..

").

146See

Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.);
id. at 183 (opinion of Iredell, J.); Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433, 444-45
(1869); Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881).
160 Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881); Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 433, 446 (1869); see EDWARD CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 204 (1938)
("[The decision in the Pollock Case was the most disabling blow ever struck at the principle of stare decisis in the field of constitutional law ..
11 Pollock, 157 U.S. at 571-72.
162

Id. at 576.

161 Id. at 578-79.

.
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real and personal property.1 54 A tax on personalty was as direct as
one on realty, and a tax on the income from property was effectively one on the property itself.155 Finally, Fuller concluded that
the remaining tax on earned income would not have been enacted
had Congress known it could not tax property income as well.1 58
This opinion was clever but not persuasive. To begin with, it
was internally inconsistent. In equating taxes on personalty with
taxes on realty, Fuller relied implicitly on a literal interpretation of
the word "direct";1 57 in equating income with property taxes, he
ignored the fact that in the same literal sense an income tax
reaches property only indirectly.1 5 8 More important, one cannot
determine whether taxes on either income or personalty are constitutionally distinguishable from taxes on land without knowing
what it is about the latter that makes them "direct," and Fuller
made no effort to explain this. Perhaps most interesting was his
failure to rely on the strongest argument for his position-Adam

154

Id. at 580.

Id. at 580-81; 158 U.S. at 627-28.
158 U.S. at 635-37. The intent-based inseparability argument manifests a healthy
shift away from the automatic inseparability rule of United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221
(1876), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 11. The unanimous additional conclusion
that the law could not constitutionally reach the income from state or municipal bonds, 157
U.S. at 583-86, was convincingly based on the intergovernmental-immunity principle of Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 125-26 (1871), overruled in part, Graves v. New York
ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 486 (1939) (salaries of government officials subject to income
taxation). Compare the converse case of Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 449, 469 (1829) (striking down state tax on interest from federal obligations); see D.
CURRIE, supra note 28, chs. 6, 8 (discussing intergovernmental tax immunities). Apart from
Pollock, however, the Court was not inclined to press intergovernmental immunity very far
at this time. See South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 463 (1905) (Brewer, J.)
(United States may tax state liquor business since it is proprietary, not governmental); Snyder v. Bettman, 190 U.S. 249, 254 (1903) (Brown, J.) (United States may tax bequest to
state); Plummer v. Coler, 178 U.S. 115, 134-38 (1900) (Shiras, J.) (state may tax bequest of
federal bonds); United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625, 630 (1896) (Brown, J.) (state may tax
bequest to United States); Reagan v. Mercantile Trust Co., 154 U.S. 413, 416-17 (1894)
(Brewer, J.) (state may regulate rates of railroad, despite federal charter, in absence of express contrary congressional intent). For discussion of these cases, see T. PowaLL, supra
note 142, at 117-18. See also Field's concurrence in Pollock, 157 U.S. at 604-05, arguing that
the article III ban on reducing judges' salaries forbade taxing the income of federal judges
already appointed. For the later fate of this interesting argument, see O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 282 (1939) (taxation of income of federal judge is not an article III
diminution), and cases cited therein.
157 Pollock, 158 U.S. at 628. As Harlan observed in dissent, 158 U.S. at 670, Fuller's
argument also failed to account for the fact that the carriage tax upheld in Hylton v. United
States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), had been a tax on personal property.
'53 See Pollock, 157 U.S. at 645 (White, J., dissenting); 158 U.S. at 692-93 (Brown, J.,
dissenting); E. CORWIN, supra note 150, at 186-87; Jones, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Company, 9 HARV. L. REV. 198, 210 (1895).
111
156
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Smith's observation, quoted by Justice Paterson in the carriage-tax
case in 1796, that all income taxes were "direct": "[T]he state, not
knowing how to tax directly and proportionably the revenue of its
subjects, endeavors to tax it indirectly, by taxing. . . the consumable commodities upon which it is laid out. ' 15 Nor, though Fuller
referred to foreign authorities that defined income taxes as direct,160 did he give significant weight to their historically respectable reasoning that direct taxes were those whose burden could not
be passed on to someone else in the price of goods or services.16 '
In short, as in its contemporaneous E.C. Knight and Debs decisions, the Court in Pollock went out of its way to protect business or property,' 62 this time by another unexpectedly narrow interpretation of congressional authority. In doing so, Fuller made
the task unnecessarily difficult by ignoring traditional criteria that
would have helped to support his conclusion.
C.

Later Cases

E.C. Knight was not alone among decisions of the period in
giving a niggardly interpretation to Congress's power over interstate commerce. In the same spirit were the holdings that neither a
restraint on stockyard sales of out-of-state cattle' 3 nor the right of
an interstate railway employee to join a union TM came under Congress's commerce clause powers. The first of these conclusions,
however, was effectively abandoned when, a few years later, Justice
Holmes, for a unanimous Court, described stockyard transactions

5 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 821 (Mod. Lib. reprint 1937, E. Cannan ed.
1904) (1st ed. London 1776), quoted in Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 180
(1796); see D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 2 (discussing question of "direct" taxation in Hylton). Fuller did quote in passing a statement of Albert Gallatin referring to Smith's definition, Pollock, 157 U.S. at 569-70, but he did not place any particular weight upon it.
160 Pollock, 157 U.S. at 572 (income taxes classified as "direct" in British law); 158 U.S.
at 630-32 (reviewing British and Canadian cases).
161See e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 823-29 (W. Ashley
ed. 1926) (1st ed. London 1848). At one point Fuller did say that this was the "[o]rdinar[y]"
test, but he added that it did not necessarily govern the meaning of article I, and he did not
discuss whether the burden of income taxes could be passed on. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 558.
161 For discussion of the hostile reaction to these three decisions, see 2 C. WARREN,
supra note 29, at 702-04.
163 Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 590-91 (1898) (Peckham, J.) (adding nothing to E.C. Knight's reasoning).
I" Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 178 (1908) (Harlan, J., over dissents by McKenna and Holmes) (alternative holding) ("[W]hat possible legal or logical connection is
there between an employ6's membership in a labor organization and the carrying on of interstate commerce?"). For criticism, see T. POWELL, supra note 142, at 62 (calling the decision "unreason run riot"); 2 C.WARREN, supra note 29, at 715.
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as part of "a current of commerce" from the rancher in one state
to the diner in another.1 6 5 The second conclusion was difficult to
square with the Court's contemporaneous acknowledgment that
Congress could abrogate the fellow-servant rule for railway employees injured in interstate commerce' 6 and prevent union mem16 7
bers from boycotting goods shipped from one state to another.
The "indirect effect" test of Knight itself, moreover, seems to have
been limited by the divided decision in the Northern $ecurities
case, which upheld application of the Sherman Act to the establishment of a holding company that eliminated competition between two interstate railroads. 6 8 For although, as Justice Harlan
stressed, interstate railroading (unlike manufacturing) was itself
interstate commerce, 6 9 the immediate effect of the combination, as

16'

Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 399 (1905); see LOREN BETH, THE DEVEL-

1877-1917, at 43-44 (1971) ("Holmes ... did not
feel the need to explain why a sugar refinery was not part of a similar flow.").
' The Employers' Liability Cases (Howard v. Illinois Cent. R.R.), 207 U.S. 463, 495
(1908) (White, J.) (dictum) ("[W]e fail to perceive any just reason for holding that Congress
is without power to regulate the relation of master and servant, to the extent that regulations adopted by Congress on that subject are solely confined to interstate commerce
.
..."); cf. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 189 (1908) (McKenna, J., dissenting) ("A
provision of law which will prevent or tend to prevent the stoppage of every wheel in every
car of an entire railroad system [by preventing strikes traceable to the discharge of union
members] certainly has as direct influence on interstate commerce as. . . the rule of liability for personal injuries to an employS."). The Court in the Employers' Liability Cases went
on to hold, rightly enough, that Congress had gone too far in extending its legislative power
to injuries of employees whose activities had no relation to interstate commerce apart from
the fact that their employer was also engaged in interstate trade, 207 U.S. at 500-01, and it
struck down the statute even as to injuries in the course of interstate commerce itself in
reliance on the questionable notions of inseparability first announced in United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876). See supra note 156 and accompanying text; see also D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 11 (discussing Reese).
167 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 305-09 (1908) (Fuller, C.J.); see Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161, 186-89 (1908) (McKenna, J., dissenting) (arguing that the ban on firing
union members was a means of preventing the "disastrous interruption of commerce" by
labor disputes of the kind that the Court, a few pages later, in Loewe, would hold Congress
could outlaw directly); see also B. WRIGHT, supra note 125, at 120 (some basis for strongly
expressed union belief in Court's unwillingness to uphold pro-labor statutes under commerce clause); Roche, EntrepreneurialLiberty and the Commerce Power: Expansion, Contraction, and Casuistryin the Age of Enterprise, 30 U. CHL L. REv. 680, 699 (1963) ("The
Supreme Court was only excluding from the commerce-police power pro-labor legislation.");
cf. In re Garnett, 141 U.S. 1, 12 (1891) (Bradley, J.) (holding that the necessary and proper
clause, together with the grant of federal judicial power over maritime cases, empowered
Congress to enact a statute protecting American shipowners by limiting their liability); Butler v. Boston & Savannah S.S. Co., 130 U.S. 527, 557 (1889) (Bradley, J.) (same).
"I
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 342-54 (1904) (Harlan, J.) (plurality opinion). Four Justices dissented, and Brewer concurred specially, but he took no issue
with this aspect of Harlan's opinion.
"I Id. at 353.
OPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION,
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in the sugar case, was not on commerce itself but on the ownership
of stock. 170 Even in the context of activities arguably ancillary to
actual interstate intercourse, then, the Fuller Court was not uniformly hostile to federal regulatory power in its construction of the
commerce clause.
In the 1903 Lottery Case,1 7 1 moreover, a bare majority of the
Court gave a broad interpretation to the commerce power in quite
a different context, upholding a federal statute that prohibited interstate transportation of lottery tickets. Except for an ill-considered insurance case that the majority inexcusably failed to discuss,17 2 there was no real doubt that this was literally a regulation
of interstate commerce.17 3 The serious question was whether the
commerce power could be exercised in order to protect the public
morals or was limited, in accordance with its motivating cause, to
preventing obstructions to commerce. 174 The constitutional text
I7

See id. at 368 (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he question in this case .

.

. is ...

whether the [commerce] power extends to regulate the ownership of stock in railroads,
which is not commerce at all."). Fuller, Peckham, and Holmes joined White's dissent, and
Holmes added another dissenting opinion.
171 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 354-55 (1903).
"72Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1869) (issuing policies of insurance not a
"transaction of commerce"), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 10. Paul was relied
on with some justice by the dissent in the Lottery Case, 188 U.S. at 367-68. See T. POWELL,
supra note 142, at 62 (criticizing the Lottery Case majority for failing to address the dissent's reliance on Paul).
'7 The objection that prohibition was not regulation, put forth in Fuller's dissent, 188
U.S. at 371-75, and dismissed by the majority, id. at 354-56, had been rejected fifty years
earlier in an opinion by Justice Daniel, the most extreme defender of states' rights ever to
grace the Court. United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560, 566-67 (1850) (Congress
may prohibit importation of counterfeit coins as a "regulation" of commerce). Harlan, for
the Court, neglected to cite Marigold. For approval of the Court's conclusion, see Parkinson,
CongressionalProhibitions of Interstate Commerce, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 367, 371-76 (1916).
Fuller's argument that power over foreign commerce (involved in Marigold) was broader
than that over interstate commerce, 188 U.S. at 373, was not dignified by a response. For
discussion of the relationship among the interstate, foreign, and Indian commerce powers,
see Cushman, The National PolicePower Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,
3 MINN. L. REV. 289, 300-02 (1919).
174 In his dissent in the Lottery Case, Fuller argued that "the purpose of Congress...
was the suppression of lotteries," 188 U.S. at 364, insisted that the states had not given
Congress police powers, id. at 365, and declared it the Court's duty to invalidate laws passed
by Congress "under the pretext of executing its powers" but actually "for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the Government," id. at 372 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819)); see 2 C. WARREN, supra note 29, at 736 ("The
practical result . . .was the creation of a Federal police power-the right to regulate the
manner of production, manufacture, sale and transportation of articles and the transportation of persons, through the medium of legislation professing to regulate commerce between
the States."). Marshall's position that the purpose of a state law determined whether it was
a regulation of commerce, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824) (dictum),
discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 6, lent oblique support to the dissenters' position.
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suggested that the power was plenary, and Justice Peckham had
already stated as much in Addyston Pipe: "The reasons which may
have caused the framers of the Constitution to repose the power to
regulate interstate commerce in Congress do not, however, affect or
limit the extent of the power itself." '
In other contexts, as illustrated by the familiar example of
blood-letting in the streets of Bologna,1 76 the purpose of a provision has quite reasonably been held to limit its scope. In Addyston
Pipe, Peckham gave no reason for refusing to look to the purposes
of the commerce clause, and he inconsistently joined the dissent in
the Lottery Case. The historical materials do not seem to refute
the reasonable textual inference that the framers' mistrust of the
states led them to give Congress control of the whole subject of
interstate commerce. 1 " But in the face of a challenging dissent,
Harlan made essentially no effort to explain.1 78

Fuller's dissent, however, needed to be squared with his earlier opinion for the Court in In
re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 134 (1892) (upholding the exclusion of lottery material from the
mails: "It is not necessary that Congress should have the power to deal with crime or immorality within the states in order to maintain that it possesses the power to forbid the use
of the mails in aid of the perpetration of crime or immorality."). Cf. United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 416-18 (1866) (upholding prohibition of liquor sales to Indians);
United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614, 621 (C.C.D. Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700) (upholding Jeffersonian embargo on ground that Congress's power over foreign commerce could be
exercised not merely to protect commerce itself but to serve "general policy and interest");
cf. also Cushman, National Police Power Under the Postal Clause of the Constitution, 4
MINN. L. REv. 402, 420 (1920) (distinguishing Rapier on the ground that government ownership may make the postal power broader); Cushman, supra note 173, at 300-02 (discussing
the possible differences among the various commerce powers).
171Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 228 (1899). The question
addressed in Addyston Pipe was the power to prevent private obstructions of commerce; it
had been argued that the purpose of the commerce clause was only to prevent obstructions
by the states. Compare the controversy over whether the second amendment's "right of the
people to keep and bear Arms" is limited by its express explanation that "[a] well regulated
Militia" is "necessary to the security of a free State." See D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 2
(discussing the ex post facto clauses).
178 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *60 (reporting that a law forbidding the drawing of blood in the streets was held "not to extend to the surgeon, who opened
the vein of a person that fell down in the street with a fit").
177See, e.g., Corwin, Congress's Power to Prohibit Commerce-A Crucial Constitutional Issue, 18 CORN. L.Q. 477, 482-84, 503-04 (1933) (supporting this conclusion).
1'7 Harlan's opinion was filled, in the execrable style of the day, with general quotations
from a myriad of commerce-clause precedents that had nothing to do with the issues in the
case. Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1888), which Harlan cited only for the
inconsequential proposition that liquor was an article of commerce, Lottery Cases, 188 U.S.
at 360, had actually given him substantial help by holding that a state could not bar entry of
interstate liquor shipments for health reasons because Congress's power over interstate commerce was exclusive, Bowman, 125 U.S. at 498-99. See D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 12
(discussing Bowman); T. POWELL, supra note 142, at 64-65 ("It might seem that after condemnation of a state law as a regulation of interstate commerce, an identical act of Congress
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Just as E.C. Knight did not signal a generally narrow approach to the commerce power, the Pollock decision did not lead to
a general judicial assault on federal taxation. The Fuller Court upheld a variety of federal taxes over the objection that they were
direct but unapportioned. 17 9 In Knowlton v. Moore'80 it held that
the constitutional requirement that indirect taxes be "uniform
throughout the United States"'"" did not outlaw progressive taxation. The Court persuasively relied on consistent congressional
practice to support the textual inference that the uniformity required was geographical alone.18 2 Most significantly, the generous
approach to federal authority reflected in the Lottery Case pre8
vailed again the following year in McCray v. United States, 3
which upheld a prohibitively high tax on colored oleomargarine,
relying partly on precedent'8 4 and partly on the question-begging
ground that "a wrongful purpose or motive" was no justification
must perforce be
179

. .

. held valid . .

").

Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363, 370-71 (1904) (Fuller, C.J.) (stamp tax on

sales of shares of stock); Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 621-23 (1902) (Brewer, J.) (tax on
tobacco); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 83 (1900) (White, J.) (tax on legacies of personal
property); Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1899) (Peckham, J.) (stamp tax on sales at
board of trade). Most of these taxes, as the Court said of death duties in Knowlton, 178 U.S.
at 55-56, could be regarded as taxes upon the occurrence of an event rather than upon the
ownership of property itself, and all seemed to fit the traditional definitions of duties or
excises, which the Constitution distinguished from direct taxes. See, e.g., Patton, 184 U.S. at
618; Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 78-79. Nevertheless, Knowlton seems to depart from the reasoning of Pollock, since a legacy tax, though-like an income tax-indirect in form, is effectively a tax on the underlying property. Compare the Court's similar distinction with respect to governmental immunity, permitting state taxation of legacies of government bonds
but prohibiting taxation of income from the same bonds. See supra note 156. The Court in
Knowlton had the benefit of a highly relevant precedent, Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.)
331, 346-348 (1875), which had upheld a tax on succession to real property. Scholey had
rested on the ground that a succession tax was no more direct than an income tax, 90 U.S.
(23 Wall.) at 347, which, before Pollock, was thought to be "indirect" for constitutional
purposes. The Knowlton Court concluded that Pollock had overruled the rationale of Scholey but not its ultimate conclusion. 178 U.S. at 79-81.
180 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (White, J.).
181 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. For a detailed analysis of this constitutional provision,
see Comment, The Uniformity Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 1193 (1984).
382 Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 83-106 (citing The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 594-95
(1884) (dictum)); cf. Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 492-96 (1904) (Brewer, J.) (Congress may lay taxes limited to Alaska to fund local-government expenses under its power to
govern the territories; the uniformity clause applies only to taxes raised for national purposes). For further discussion of the scope of the uniformity requirement, see Currie, The
Constitution in the Supreme Court: Full Faithand the Bill of Rights, 1889-1910 (forthcoming) (discussing Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)).
183 195 U.S. 27 (1904) (White, J.).
18, The Court relied especially on Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869),
where, as McCray conceded, 195 U.S. at 58, the conclusion relied on had been an alternative
holding. See D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 9 (discussing Veazie).
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for judicial interference with "the exercise of lawful power.'185
This decision was a far cry from E.C. Knight, and it was not surprising that Fuller and two others dissented. 1 6 After McCray, it
seemed that Congress could forbid anything under the guise of taxing it, 187 notwithstanding the framers' plan of a federal government

with limited, enumerated powers. 188
IV.

OBSTRUCTIONS TO INTERSTATE COMMERCE

Long before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court had developed the debatable thesis that the clause
giving Congress power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce
implicitly limited state authority to interfere with business that
transcended state lines. 8 9 Since no Justice had ever taken the extreme position that the states lacked authority to affect interstate
commerce altogether, a number of conflicting theories had grown
up to explain when the states could affect commerce and when
they could not. Marshall had distinguished between the regulation
of commerce as such and the exercise of the states' reserved police
powers; 90 Curtis had said that the states could regulate commerce
in matters not requiring uniformity;' 9' some later Justices had said
that the states could pass laws having "indirect" or "incidental"
effects on commerce. 192 The failure of Congress to enact legislation
," McCray, 195 U.S. at 56.
'"
Id. at 64 (without opinion). For resolution of another constitutional issue respecting
federal taxation, see Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 203 (1897) (Harlan, J.) (statute that imposed a tax earmarked for the costs of printing bank notes was not a "Bill[] for
raising Revenue" required by art. I, § 7 to "originate in the House of Representatives":
"There was no purpose ... to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the Government."); accord Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 437 (1906) (McKenna, J.) (tax levied to defray cost of building a railroad station not a revenue bill, but
merely a "means to the purposes provided by the act").
187 See A. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 29, at 784; 2 C. WARREN, supra note 29, at 738;
Beck, Nullification by Indirection, 23 HARv. L. REv. 441, 442-45 (1910). The only constitutional limits suggested by the McCray opinion concerned "freedom and justice" and due
process, not federalism. 195 U.S. at 62-64.
188 The Lottery Case itself had not gone so far; much remains outside congressional
power even if the authority to regulate interstate commerce may be exercised for police
purposes. See Cushman, The National Police Power Under the Taxing Clause of the Constitution,4 MINN. L. REV. 247, 249, 255 (1920) (adding the argument that the power "[t]o lay
and collect Taxes ... to ... provide for the ... general Welfare," U.S. CONST.art. I, § 8,
cl. 1, meant the power to raise money to be spent for general welfare).
'8 See D. CURRIE, supra note 28, chs. 6, 7, 10, 12 (discussing the growth of the doctrine
of the "dormant" commerce clause).
190 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203-05, 200 (1824).
"' Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319-20 (1852).
182 See, e.g., Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 102-04 (1877) (Field, J.).
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had been interpreted sometimes to permit, 9 ' and sometimes to
forbid,19 4 state action.
It was not until after the Civil War that the commerce clause
was unambiguously employed to strike down state legislation, but
in the remaining years of the Court's first century it was wielded
with increasing frequency to protect commerce against state interference. Prediction of the fate of any state law became extremely
hazardous. None of the Court's tests suggested clear solutions to
particular controversies, and the Justices compounded the confusion by employing different tests in successive cases. Nor were the
results easy to reconcile on any theory; by the time Fuller's term
began, there were precedents to justify almost anything the Court
1 95
might choose to decide.
In the ensuing twenty years, the Court added greatly to the
stock of decisions in this field. In so doing, without much fanfare,
it managed both to shift the overall tendency of the decisions and
to make a modest start toward reducing the doctrinal confusion.
A.

Leisy v. Hardin

Once upon a time, John Marshall had said in dictum,' and
the Court had later held, 197 that state laws passed in the legitimate
pursuit of health, safety, or other noncommercial "police power"
goals were valid without regard to their impact on interstate commerce.' 98 Though an important 1876 Miller opinion'9 9 had purported to reject this entire theory in favor of the uniformity test
first enunciated by Curtis in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, °0 the
police-power criterion sprang up again almost immediately2 0 ' and
was the basis of an important 1888 decision upholding state examiSee, e.g., id. at 104.
191See, e.g., Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 (1876).
195 See D. CURRIE, supra note 28, chs. 10, 12.
'93

"" Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203-04, 209 (1824) (dictum), discussed in D.
CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 6.
"' New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 137-41 (1837), discussed in D. CURRm,

supra note 28, ch. 7.
lg In the absence, that is, of any conflicting federal statute. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) at 210.
" Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 271-73 (1876), discussed in D. CURRIE,

supra note 28, ch. 12.
200
201

53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319-20 (1852).
Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1878) (dictum) (holding struck down a

police-power measure unnecessarily obstructing interstate commerce), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 12.
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nation and licensing of interstate railway engineers. 0 2 It therefore
required considerable gymnastic ability for the Court to conclude,
just before Fuller's appointment, in the teeth of a forty-year-old
decision that had allowed states to bar the sale of liquor imported
from other states, 0 3 that the police power did not justify a state
ban on importing such liquor in the first place. 0 4 It remained for
Fuller himself, in one of his first constitutional opinions, to overrule the old precedent and hold that no state could forbid the sale
05
of out-of-state liquor in its original package.
As an omen of what sort of opinions one could expect from the
new Chief Justice, Leisy v. Hardin was not exactly cheering. The
opinion commences with a hackneyed and useless background recitation of the type we have come to associate with legal encyclopedias. After two pages of this, in which he recited Curtis's and Marshall's conflicting theories in consecutive sentences with no
apparent appreciation of their incompatibility,0 6 Fuller turned to
Brown v. Maryland.0 7 In Brown, the Court, through Chief Justice
Marshall, had held that a state could not tax goods imported from
foreign countries while still in their original package;20 8 Marshall
added that a state equally could not tax imports from other states
of the union.20 9 Omitting to note that this dictum had been
squarely repudiated in Woodruff v. Parham,2 1 0 Fuller proceeded to
quote hemorrhagically from Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern
Railway Co., 211 the recent decision that had struck down a state
ban on the importation of liquor, where the Court had expressly
distinguished power over importation from power over sales. 212
20 Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 480 (1888).
203 The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note
28, ch. 7.
20 Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 488-91 (1888), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 12.
205 Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
20 Id. at 108-09.
207 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827), discussed in Leisy, 135 U.S. at 110-11.
208 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 445.
209 Id. at 449.
210 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 139 (1869), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 10.
Woodruff flatly held that the imports clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2, which had been
the principal basis of Brown, was wholly inapplicable to imports from other states and declared that the commerce clause forbade only discriminatory taxation of sister-state goods
even while they remained in their original package. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 140. Contrary to
Fuller's statement in Leisy, 135 U.S. at 110, the commerce clause itself seems not to have
figured significantly in the Brown decision. See D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 6 (discussing
Brown).
211 125 U.S. 465 (1888).
212 Id. at 498-99.
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Fuller did not explain why the two cases were similar.2 13 He did
recite, ad nauseam, the arguments that Chief Justice Taney had
used to uphold a similar law in the License Cases,1 4 adding only
that Taney had not appreciated the subtleties of the uniformity
test developed in later cases 21 5 but not disclosing why liquor sales
required uniform regulation. Instead, he launched into a five-page
enumeration of the results of previous decisions striking down or
upholding various state laws without ever venturing to say which
ones Leisy most closely resembled.2
There follows the unex21 7
plained conclusion that the law was unconstitutional.
Fuller's lamentable opinion notwithstanding, Bowman's heavy
reliance on decisions striking down taxes on sales of out-of-state
goods 218 made Leisy almost a foregone cohclusion. 2 9' Leisy thus
seemed to suggest not only the primacy of Cooley's uniformity
standard but also a continuation of the Waite Court's tendency toward vigorous protection of commerce from state obstruction.2 2 °
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214

Leisy, 135 U.S. at 111-15.
See id. at 115-18 (citing The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 576, 578-79, 586

(1847)).
215
21s

"
218

See Leisy, 135 U.S. at 118.
Id. at 119-23.

Id. at 124-25.
Bowman, 125 U.S. at 495-98; see also id. at 499 (implicitly casting doubt on the

result in the License Cases because "the very purpose ...

sale").

of ...

transportation[] is...

219 A wordy dissent by three Justices, none of whom had joined the decision in Bowman, suddenly found merit in the unconvincing argument of the Bowman majority, 125 U.S.
at 498, that, in forbidding importation, the state had attempted to regulate conduct beyond
its own borders. Leisy, 135 U.S. at 155-56 (Gray, J., joined by Harlan and Brewer, JJ., dissenting). The dissenters' police-power argument, id. at 158-60, had been substantially refuted by Bowman, and they did not explain their less-than-obvious conclusion that the Cooley requirement of uniformity was more significant for importation than for sales, id. at 15758. The dissent could have derived some support from cases allowing state taxation of goods
that had come to rest after an interstate journey, see Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622, 63233 (1885), or that had not yet begun one, see Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 524-25 (1885).
Indeed, United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (discussed supra notes 126-45
and accompanying text), coming five years after Leisy, cast doubt on the proposition that
local sales of out-of-state goods fell within the commerce power at all. Gray's Leisy dissent
did mention Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) (Lamar, J.), which had suggestively held
that a state could prohibit the distilling of liquor for export on the ground that manufacture
preceded commerce, see id. at 25-26, but Gray failed to notice its usefulness to his argument. Leisy, 135 U.S. at 157 (dissenting opinion). On the other hand, Welton v. Missouri, 91
U.S. 275, 282 (1876), which invalidated a local sales tax that discriminated against sellers of
out-of-state goods, showed the danger of this approach. Cf. Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 123, 140 (1869) (upholding a nondiscriminatory tax); D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 12
(discussing Welton and Woodruff).
220 Indeed, in the companion case of Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U.S. 161, 166 (1890) (Fuller,
C.J.), the Court applied Leisy to hold that a state also could not tax the sale of sister-state
liquor in its original package, on the ground that "no State has the right to lay a tax on
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Rahrer and Plumley

Near the end of his Leisy opinion, the Chief Justice tossed off
the following remarkable dictum:
[T]he responsibility is upon Congress, so far as the regulation
of interstate cbmmerce is concerned, to remove the restriction
upon the State in dealing with imported articles of trade
within its limits, which have not been mingled with the common mass of property therein, if in its judgment the end to be
secured justifies and requires such action.2 2 '
Congress snapped at the opportunity in a trice, subjecting all imported liquors to state police-power laws "upon arrival" to the
same extent as if they had been locally produced. 2 2 Though Cooley had flatly said that Congress could not empower the states to
do what the commerce clause forbade, 223 Fuller and his brethren
dutifully upheld Congress's action in In re Rahrer224-and had the
temerity to declare, in plain contradiction of the facts, that the
'225
statute "imparted no power to the State not then possessed.
The state law in question had been enacted before Congress
spoke, and Justice Curtis had conceded in Cooley that Congress
might be able to adopt existing state laws as its own. 2 6 Far from
distinguishing Cooley on this basis, however, Fuller assumed that
the state could have reenacted its law after Congress acted and
rejected the argument that it was required to do so. 2 7 Rather, the
Chief Justice argued that Congress had enacted a uniform regulation of its own "divest[ing]" imported beverages of their "characinterstate commerce in any form." Though the tax in fact discriminated against out-of-state
goods, id., the Court did not rest its decision on this fact. The decision thus seemed to
undermine the basis of Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 140 (1869), which had
upheld a nondiscriminatory tax on the local sale of goods, and which was not cited by the
Lyng Court.
2 Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1890).
Act of Aug. 8, 1890 (Wilson Act), ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412,
426 (1898) (White, J.), undermined the apparent purpose of the Act-which was to return
effective control of liquor to the states-by holding that liquor did not "arriv[e]" until received by the consignee, so that while a state could forbid resale in the original package, it
could not forbid importation. See 2 C. WARREN, supra note 29, at 731-32; see also Scott v.
Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 100 (1897) (Shiras, J.) (confirming the apparent statutory requirement
that the state not discriminate against foreign liquor); Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co., 170
U.S. 438, 449-52 (1898) (White, J.) (interpreting the nondiscrimination requirement).
M22
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318 (1852).
224 140 U.S. 545 (1891).
221Id. at 564.
"2 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 317-18 (1852).
Rahrer, 140 U.S. at 565.
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ter" as "subjects of interstate commerce. . . at an earlier period of
time than would otherwise be the case. ' 228 If this meant that Congress was to be sole judge of the meaning of the commerce clause,
it was contrary to Marbury v. Madison; 29 if it meant that Congress could authorize state regulations that the Constitution itself
forbade, it left the Cooley argument unanswered.2 3 0
The opinion seemed to be on the right track when it observed
that some of the express limits on state authority in article I, section 10 could be removed by Congress. 231 But Fuller failed to develop the argument that, in light of its purpose of permitting Congress to determine the extent to which commerce should be
regulated, the implicit commerce-clause limitation should be analogized to these removable limitations rather than to such express
limitations as are immune from congressional action.2 32 Congress,
as Fuller said, had made the decision "that the common interests
23 3
did not require entire freedom in the traffic in ardent spirits,
and this decision seems to have satisfied the framers' reasons for
giving the power to Congress.
Thus, despite the flaws in his reasoning, Fuller seems to have
reached a defensible result in Rahrer. His opinions in Leisy and
Rahrer together, moreover, show a consistent commitment neither
to the police power nor to freedom of commerce but to the more
neutral institutional principle that Congress should determine the
balance between them.
It is not so easy, however, to find consistency between Leisy
and the 1894 case of Plumley v. Massachusetts, 2 4 which held that,
although Congress had not spoken, a state was free to forbid the
sale of out-of-state colored oleomargarine in its original package.23 5

228

Id. at 561-62.

228

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-79 (1803); see Bikl6, The Silence of Congress,41 HARV. L.

REv. 200, 209-10 (1927).
230 Fuller hinted, correctly enough, that, to the extent that the state's inability to act
was based on an implicit congressional prohibition, the inability could be cured by a federal
statute. Rahrer, 140 U.S. at 559-60, 562. Apart from inherent difficulties with the argument
from congressional inaction, however, there were too many decisions basing the invalidity of
state laws on the commerce clause itself for this explanation to be convincing.
231 Id.
at 560. Article I, section 10 provides, in part, that "[n]o state shall, without the
Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, Keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of
Peace, [or] enter into any Agreement or Compact with another state" (emphasis added).
232 See D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 7 (discussing this issue in connection with Cooley);
T. POWELL, supra note 142, at 161.
23
234
235

Rahrer, 140 U.S. at 561.
155 U.S. 461 (1894).
Id. at 478-79.
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Fuller appropriately dissented."'
Harlan, who had dissented in Leisy, wrote for the Court. He
argued that the only reason for coloring margarine yellow was to
deceive buyers into thinking it was butter and that it was within
the state's police powers to prevent such deception. 3 7 This argument might have been persuasive enough before Leisy. To distinguish Leisy, Harlan said only that there had been no effort to pass
off the beer in that case as anything but beer;28s he did not say why
the state's interest in guarding its citizens from confusing one
healthful product with another was more deserving of constitutional protection than its interest in guarding them from consuming substances destructive of health.3 9
The truth was that not one Justice who voted to uphold the
state's power over margarine had denied its power over liquor.
Four Justices who had voted with the majority in Leisy had left
the Court, 240 and their successors voted in Plumley with two of the
Leisy dissenters. 241 The distinction between the cases, to borrow
Thomas Reed Powell's phrase, seemed to be "the intervening
'2 2
change in the composition of the Court.
C.

Later Decisions
Although the Court soon suggested that cigarettes were still
236Id.

at 480-82. Oddly, he neglected to cite Leisy.
Id. at 467-68. The dissenters responded with some force that there was no chance of
deception since both state and federal law already required explanatory packaging and labeling. Id. at 481. But the only precedents suggesting that a state had to exercise its police
powers in the manner that was least restrictive of interstate commerce had been in the
context of regulations discriminating against foreign goods, see, e.g., Railroad Co. v. Husen,
95 U.S. 465 (1878), while the Massachusetts law was facially neutral: it prohibited the sale
of all colored oleomargarine. The Court seemed unconcerned by the possibility that the law
might have had the discriminatory effect of protecting the local butter industry from
outside competition.
238Plumley, 155 U.S. at 474.
3, See Carman, Comments on Federal Trust Legislation, 12 POL. Sc. Q. 622, 634
(1897) (distinction between Leisy and Plumley "untenable"). That the Court did not take
the health interest lightly had been made clear by the Court's unanimous and ringing depiction of the evils of drink in upholding a prohibition law against due-process objections in
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662-63 (1887). Mugler makes it hard to explain the contrast
between Plumley and Leisy on the ground that the Justices were an ardent bunch of wets.
See D. CuRm,supra note 28, ch. 11 (discussing Mugler).
240Miller, Bradley, Blatchford, and Lamar.
128 The successors, Brown, Shiras, Jackson, and White, voted with Harlan and Gray.
1"1 T. POWELL, supra note 142, at 110. Justice Brewer, who joined the dissent in Leisy,
1S7

also joined the dissent in Plumley. For reasons already suggested, there were several plausible grounds for concluding, as Brewer seems to have done, that Leisy was the stronger case
for allowing state regulation.
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governed by the Leisy rule, 243 later decisions of the Fuller period
confirm Plumley's implication that Leisy was a misleading indicator of what was to come. In the first place, Cooley's uniformity
test, which had figured so prominently in Leisy as well as in earlier
opinions, 244 practically disappeared for the time being. 245 Furthermore, on balance the new Justices seemed, if anything, less inclined than their predecessors to protect commerce from state
obstruction.
In 1878, for example, the Court had held that a state law for242 Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343, 350 (1900) (Brown, J.). The Court held, however,
in order to prevent evasion of state laws, that retail-sized ten-cigarette packets were not
"original packages" for purposes of the Leisy doctrine, when they had been shipped interstate in large baskets. Id. at 360-61. Brewer, Shiras, Peckham, and Fuller dissented. For a
perceptive contemporaneous criticism of both the Court's reasoning and the original-package doctrine itself, see Miller, The Latest Phase of the OriginalPackage Doctrine,35 AM. L.

REv. 364 (1901).
244 Two early cases of the period invoking the uniformity rationale were Western Union
Tel. Co. v. James, 162 U.S. 650, 660 (1896) (Peckham, J.) (liability for nondelivery of interstate telegrams was not "so extensive and national in character, that it could only be dealt
with by Congress"), and Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 22122 (1894) (Brown, J.) (invalidating state regulation of interstate bridge tolls).
245 At the same time that the Cooley test was disappearing from the commerce-clause
cases, it cropped up as a test for determining when state laws were preempted by the extension of federal judicial power to "Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction," U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2. Building in part on Justice Bradley's assertion that there was a federal common
law in this field because the framers had sought "uniformity and consistency," The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1875), the Fuller Court refused to recognize state laws
that immunized municipalities from maritime tort liability, Workman v. New York City, 179
U.S. 552, 557-63 (1900) (White, J.), or that created maritime liens for materials and services
provided to an out-of-state vessel at the request of an independent contractor, The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185, 195-99 (1903) (Brown, J.). In both cases, however, a more obvious
ground was also given: the state laws contradicted federal common law. See The Roanoke,
189 U.S. at 196; Workman, 179 U.S. at 558, 563.
Confusion arose when Justice Holmes failed to deal adequately with either the
supremacy or the uniformity criterion in upholding the application of a state wrongfuldeath statute to a maritime accident. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 404-06 (1907). The Court
had already held that, in the absence of congressional legislation, a state wrongful-death
action might apply to a maritime accident without unduly disrupting the freedom of trade
guaranteed by the commerce clause. Sherlock v. Ailing, 93 U.S. 99, 104 (1876). Thus, it was
reasonable enough to conclude that such an action might be maintained without offending
the similar and equally shaky uniformity thesis that the Court had enunciated under the
admiralty clause. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. at 404-05. In his usual breezy way, however,
Holmes did not stop to distinguish Workman and The Roanoke, though he might have done
so on the ground that the absence of a federal common law death remedy reflected not a
federal policy opposing such relief but only the traditional notion that such actions could be
created only by statute, The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 213-14 (1886); see D. CURRIE, supra
note 28, ch. 12 (discussing Sherlock). Another ground of distinction might have been that a
state remedy that merely extended liability for .the breach of a preexisting federal duty of
care did not subject the owner to uncertainty as to his standard of conduct. See Currie,
Federalismand the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess", 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 158, 172, 18688.
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bidding racial segregation in public conveyances could not be applied to a ship traveling interstate;2 46 in 1890 it upheld a state requirement that interstate trains provide separate cars for blacks
and whites.2 4 Before Fuller's appointment, the Court had held
that no state could tax the gross receipts of interstate transport;2 48
thereafter it displayed increased receptiveness to apportionment
formulas that required interstate commerce to pay its way while
relieving it of the most obvious multiple burdens. 249 Moreover,
while the Court displayed a tendency to declare that the states had
no power at all to regulate interstate commerce itself,250 it managed to uphold a number of significant restrictions of such com-

2"e

Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 488-90 (1878), discussed in D.

CURRIE,

supra note 28,

ch. 12.
2" Louisville, N.O. & T. Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587, 592 (1890) (Brewer, J.).
Harlan and Bradley sharply dissented: "It is difficult to understand how a state enactment,
requiring the separation of the white and black races on interstate carriers of passengers, is
a regulation of commerce among the States, while a similar enactment forbidding such separation is not. . . ." Id. at 594. The majority responded that the state court had construed
the statute to apply only to intrastate commerce, id. at 591, but the state court had applied
the law to intrastate passengers on interstate trains, which apparently were the only kind
that the defendant was running. See Louisville, N.O. & T. Ry. v. State, 66 Miss. 662, 675
(1889). The complaining passenger in the 1878 case had been traveling locally as well, and
the Court had noted that the "disposition of passengers taken up and put down within the
State . . . cannot but affect . . . those taken up without and brought within." Hall v.
DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 489 (1878). The Court in Louisville stressed that the power of the state
to require actual segregated seating was not in issue but only the expense of adding a separate car for blacks-an expense no greater than that under "statutes requiring certain accommodations at depots, compelling trains to stop at crossings of other railroads, and a
multitude of other matters confessedly within the power of the State." Louisville, 133 U.S.
at 591. For criticism of the decision, see 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 751-52 (1984).
24 Philadelphia & S.S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326, 341-44 (1887) (domestic
corporation); Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U.S. 230, 243-44 (1887) (out-of-state corporation); see
D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 12.
28 See, e.g., Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S. 490, 499 (1904) (Holmes, J.) (upholding apportioned tax on express company property); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165
U.S. 194, 226 (1897) (Fuller, C.J.) (same); Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U.S. 217, 228-29
(1891) (Field, J.) (upholding privilege tax measured by gross receipts apportioned by mileage); Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 26 (1891) (Gray, J.) (upholding
property tax on railroad cars apportioned by mileage). Arguably out of line with the Court's
apparent concern for avoiding the competitive disadvantage of multiple burdens was the
decision allowing a railroad's home state to tax the total value of its rolling stock, though
the above decisions seemed to say that such property was also subject to taxation in other
states on an apportioned basis. New York ex rel. New York Cent. & H.R.R.R. v. Miller, 202
U.S. 584, 597 (1906) (Holmes, J.) (avoiding the problem by doubting that any cars in question were "so continuously in any other State as to be taxable there"). The holding of the
Grand Trunk case with respect to privilege taxes was soon qualified by the suggestion that
the payment of such a tax could not be made a condition of doing interstate business. Postal
Tel. Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S. 688, 698 (1895) (Fuller, C.J.) (dictum).
250 See, e.g., Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 57-60 (1891) (Bradley, J.).
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merce by labeling them as the "indirect" effects of regulating
something else.2 51
More interesting than the results was the growing consensus
on the applicable criteria. Outside the tax field, the dominant
theme was that of the police power.2 52 But Marshall's Gibbons
test2 5 had undergone a significant evolution: the Court increasingly insisted that exercises of the police power that affected interstate or foreign commerce be "reasonable. 25 4 Reasonableness, in
turn, tended to depend upon how seriously the measure impinged
on commerce and how necessary it was to accomplish the policepower goal. In quarantine cases, for example, where a similar
calculus had been applied as early as 1878,255 the Court continued
to inquire whether the state had gone further to restrict commerce
than the need justified. 5 6
The quarantine cases generally dealt with measures that
targeted out-of-state goods for unfavorable treatment. But in the
Fuller period the Court applied the same test not only to cases in
which facially neutral rules had disproportionate effects on outside
producers 257 but also to cases in which there was no suggestion of
25 See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U.S. 198, 202 (1901) (Brewer, J.) (upholding temporary ban on importation of sheep from area where disease was prevalent); Erb v. Morasch,
177 U.S. 584, 585 (1900) (Brewer, J.) (upholding six-miles-per-hour speed limit for trains in
city); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Solan, 169 U.S. 133, 137-38 (1898) (Gray, J.) (upholding
ban on railroad's right to contract out of liability for negligent personal injury); New York,
N.H. & H.R.R. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628, 631-32 (1897) (Harlan, J.) (upholding prohibition
of heating stoves in railroad cars); Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, 308-09, 317-18
(1896) (Harlan, J.) (upholding ban on running freight trains on Sunday); Louisville &
N.R.R. v. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677, 701 (1896) (Brown, J.) (upholding prohibition on consolidation of in-state with out-of-state railroads).
252 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 251; ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER §§ 136-138
(1904).
253 See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
254 E.g., Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 152 (1902) (Harlan, J.) (upholding state ban on
importation of diseased livestock); Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U.S. 427, 430-31 (1897) (Gray,
J.) (upholding state statute that required intrastate trains to stop at county seats); New
York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628, 631 (1897) (Harlan, J.) (upholding state
railroad safety regulations); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 163 U.S. 142, 154 (1896) (Gray, J.)
(striking down state statute that required fast interstate mail trains to stop at county seats);
see also cases cited infra notes 256-59; Shenton, Interstate Commerce Duringthe Silence of
Congress, 23 DIcm. L. REv. 78 (1919).
I'l Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 473-74 (1878) (striking down overbroad state
prohibition of shipment of cattle from area where disease was prevalent), discussed in D.
CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 12.
256 See, e.g., Smith v. St. Louis & S.W. Ry., 181 U.S. 248, 255, 257 (1901) (McKenna, J.)
(upholding a temporary ban on importation of cattle from area at risk of disease; Harlan,
White, and Brown dissented).
M See, e.g., Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 82-84 (1891) (Harlan, J.) (striking down
requirement of inspection of meat shipped over 100 miles).
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either facial discrimination or disparate impact. In a revealing series of decisions, for example, the Court permitted states to inflict
"reasonable" burdens on commerce by requiring some interstate
trains to make stops at specified stations, 58 but drew the line
whenever it concluded that adequate service had already been provided.2 59 And even Plumley itself was confined by the Court's determination that deception could be effectively prevented without
banning the sale of all margarine 6 ° or requiring that it be colored
261
pink.
The opinions of the Fuller period did not always acknowledge
that the question was one of reasonableness. Justice Brewer protested in at least one concurrence that the reasonableness of a "direct" burden on interstate commerce was an irrelevant consideration.26 2 An exercise of the state's police power, Justice White said
on another occasion, was an impermissible regulation of commerce
if its effect on interstate commerce was direct.263 But the "directness" of an effect seemed to have less to do with the immediacy of
its impact than with its severity. In one of the last decisions of the
period, for example, reaffirming its view that the effect of a safety
measure determined whether it was a forbidden regulation of corn"'

See, e.g., Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Ohio, 173 U.S. 285, 300-03 (1899) (Harlan, J.).

253

See, e.g., Herndon v. Chicago R.I. & P. Ry., 218 U.S. 135, 156-57 (1910) (Day, J.);

Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Illinois, 177 U.S. 514, 521 (1900) (Brown, J.). This is not to
say that the results of these decisions were wholly consistent. Compare Illinois Cent. R.R. v.
Illinois, 163 U.S. 142, 153-54 (1896) (state cannot require fast interstate mail train to detour
seven miles from main line to serve a single county seat), with Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v.
Ohio, 173 U.S. 285, 300-03 (1899) (state may require six interstate trains per day to stop at
every town with 3000 or more inhabitants), and Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v. Mississippi, 210
U.S. 187, 203 (1908) (McKenna, J.) (state may require a state-chartered railroad company to
construct an interstate line so as to pass through a county seat).
210 Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 14-15, 17-18 (1898) (Peckham, J.).
' Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U.S. 30, 33 (1898) (Peckham, J.). These decisions
suggest a ground on which Plumley and Leisy might be reconciled after all: the burden of
the ban on yellow margarine was less than that of liquor sales because it did not block
access to margarine entirely. Cf. Houston & T.C.R.R. v. Mayes, 201 U.S. 321, 329-31 (1906)
(Brown, J.) (acknowledging legitimate police-power purpose in assuring adequate provision
of freight cars but holding that absolute requirement of furnishing cars on customers' demand was unreasonable).
62 Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Illinois, 177 U.S. 514, 523 (1900) (concurring
opinion).
2" McNeill v. Southern Ry., 202 U.S. 543, 561 (1906) (striking down a state administrative order requiring delivery of railroad cars to a private siding). Justice Peckham had a
marked tendency to label the effect on commerce of any law he struck down as "direct."
See, e.g., Central of Ga. Ry. v. Murphey, 196 U.S. 194, 203-04, 206 (1905) (striking down
requirement that initial carrier trace freight lost by connecting road); Louisville & N.R.R. v.
Eubank, 184 U.S. 27, 36 (1902) (striking down statute that prohibited railroads from charging a higher rate for short hauls than for long hauls).
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merce, the Court dismissed a challenge to a law that required
trains to stop for cross traffic because the number of crossings had
not adequately been alleged.2 64 A large number of stops would have
a more serious impact on commerce than a small number, but not,
in any literal sense, a more direct one. In short, despite continuing
efforts to cloak what was going on in more formalistic terms, the
decisions themselves suggest that the Court had agreed in substance to what Justices Harlan and Brown were the most candid in
revealing:2 6 5 the test of whether a measure subjected interstate
commerce to impermissible burdens was whether the effect on
commerce was unreasonable in light of the state's asserted inter266
est.
This is of course the modern test.26 7 It makes perfect sense in

264
261

Southern Ry. v. King, 217 U.S. 524, 536-37 (1910) (Day, J.).
See, e.g., Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148, 151 (1902) (Harlan, J.); Smith v. St.

Louis & S.W. Ry., 181 U.S. 248, 262-63 (1901) (Brown, J., dissenting); id. at 260 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Illinois, 177 U.S. 514, 517-18, 522 (1900)
(Brown, J.); Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Ohio, 173 U.S. 285, 300 (1899) (Harlan, J.); New
York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628, 631-32 (1897) (Harlan, J.).
28 The Court also continued its effort to avoid the special disadvantage of multiple
taxation. See supra note 249. Outright discrimination against interstate operations continued to be struck down in most instances. See, e.g., I.M. Darnell & Son Co. v. City of Memphis, 208 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1908) (White, J.) (property tax exempting local products); Voight
v. Wright, 141 U.S. 62, 66-67 (1891) (Bradley, J.) (inspection of out-of-state flour). Indeed,
on occasion the Court would look behind a measure that was nondiscriminatory on its face
to find an unjustified preference for local interests. See, e.g., Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S.
78, 82-84 (1891) (Harlan, J.) (inspection requirement for meat shipped over 100 miles); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1890) (Harlan, J.) (ban on sale of meat not inspected
within state before slaughter). Occasionally, however, the Court was unable to perceive discrimination where in fact it seemed to exist. See, e.g., Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 278
(1900) (Fuller, C.J.) (upholding tax on agents hiring persons to work outside state); New
York v. Roberts, 171 U.S. 658, 662-63 (1898) (Shiras, J.) (upholding a general corporate
franchise tax that exempted corporations that carried on all of their manufacture within the
state, on the irrelevant ground that an out-of-state corporation that carried on all of its
manufacturing operations within the state would also be exempt). Two famous decisions,
moreover, expressly upheld discrimination against interstate commerce on the shaky and
unexplained ground that the commodities to be shipped out of state were owned by the
people of the state. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908)
(Holmes, J.) (water); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 532 (1896) (White, J.) (birds), overruled, Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979). For a prior similar holding under the
privileges and immunities clause, see McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1877) (state
may limit right to use its oyster beds to its own citizens), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note
28, ch. 12. The pedigree of the ownership theory was doubtful; as Field observed, dissenting
in Geer, 161 U.S. at 539-40, many natural-law authorities of the sort cited by the majority
seemed to say that wild game was owned by nobody. Moreover, the relevance of ownership
to the purposes of the commerce clause was not made clear. For a thorough modern discussion, see Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. RE,. 487 (1981).
267 See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142-45 (1970); Southern Pac. Co.
v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 781-82 (1945).
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light of the Court's longstanding perception that the clause directed the courts to protect the interest in unobstructed trade
without denying the states all power to promote their traditional
concerns. Very likely, as Justice Stone would later say, 268 the Court
had really been balancing state and federal interests in commerceclause cases all along; Stone himself was to make the process far
more visible than the Fuller Court had done. 269 Despite the bad
start in Leisy v. Hardin,the Fuller Court, if not always explicitly,
took a significant step in the right direction.
V.

DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

To modern readers, perhaps the most memorable fourteenthamendment decision of the Fuller years was Justice Brown's 1896
opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson27 0 upholding a state law requiring
"equal but separate" rail accommodations. At the time, however,
despite Justice Harlan's celebrated and impassioned dissent, the
outcome should have appeared pretty well predetermined by the
unanimous but, oddly enough, uncited 1883 decision in Pace v. Alabama2 7 -which Harlan had joined-endorsing the same principle
in the context of interracial sex relations. 2 In any event, Plessy
was a reliable symbol of the times. The Fuller Court did little to
further the fourteenth amendment's central goal of racial justice; 273
Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (dissenting opinion).
244 Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 781-82 (1945).
.70 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
271 106 U.S. 583 (1883), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 11.
"I For discussion of the relationship between Pace and Plessy, see Roche, Civil Liberty
in the Age of Enterprise, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 103, 112-13 (1963). The fact that Pace's reasoning was not repeated in Plessy, taken together with Justice Brown's declaration that the
fourteenth amendment had not been intended "to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality," Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544, led Professor Schmidt to the interesting conclusion
that Plessy was not based upon the "equality" of black and white accommodations at all.
See A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 247, at 755-56. Later in the opinion, however,
"social equality" was employed in contrast to "equal rights before the law" in a context
suggesting that Brown may have meant only that the state was not responsible for the practical inequality resulting from the attitudes of private citizens. 163 U.S. at 551-52.
273 See Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (Brewer, J.) (ignoring an equalprotection argument in upholding a statute forbidding private schools to teach blacks and
whites together on the ground of the state's control over its corporations); Hodges v. United
States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906) (Brown, J.) (reaffirming that private conspiracy against blacks did
not come within the fourteenth amendment); Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ.,
175 U.S. 528 (1899) (refusing to enjoin spending solely for white high school while questioning whether equal protection denied); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (McKenna, J.) (refusing to find that state laws limiting jury service to literate taxpayers discriminated on racial grounds). But see Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900) (Gray, J.) (states
may not exclude blacks from grand juries); cf. Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146 (1904), and
2"0
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it was in the economic arena that Fuller and his brethren made
fourteenth-amendment history.
Two of the most significant conclusions of the Court before
Fuller's appointment had been that the due process clauses imposed substantive limits on legislative power and that the equal
protection clause was not restricted to racial classifications." 4
Neither of these conclusions had been adequately explained, and
neither had been applied unequivocally as the Court's sole reason
for invalidating government action. 7 5 Fuller and his brethren
never made up for the failure of their predecessors to justify their
debatable dicta, but they transformed both conclusions into law.
Indeed, it is for the aggressive invocation of substantive due process that the Fuller period is best known today. But an examination
of the entire body of cases reveals that, even in those days, most
laws passed muster under the due process and equal protection
clauses; the exceptions should not be taken to have established the
rule.
A. Rate Regulation
In 1877, in Munn v. Illinois,276 the Court, over Justice Field's

dissent, had upheld state regulation of grain-elevator rates while
implying that the regulatory power was limited to businesses "affected with a public interest.

21 7

A few years later the Court

Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (finding procedural roadblocks to damage and injunctive
relief, respectively, for the alleged disfranchisement of black voters).
There were two significant thirteenth amendment cases during this time. In Robertson
v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-83 (1897), a learned opinion by Justice Brown relied largely on
history and necessity to uphold a statute forbidding desertion by merchant seamen: "[T]he
amendment was not intended to introduce any novel doctrine with respect to certain descriptions of service which have always been treated as exceptional ...." Brown added
more generally and more disturbingly that servitude pursuant to an uncoerced contract was
not "involuntary." Justice Harlan dissented. The narrow definition of involuntariness espoused in Robertson was abandoned in Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905)
(Brewer, J.) (upholding a federal statute outlawing "peonage" even where a debtor had
agreed to work for his creditor: "peonage, however created, is compulsory service, involuntary servitude"). For general discussion of the Fuller Court's treatment of racial issues, see
A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 247, at 751-60, 837-41, 923-27; Schmidt, Juries,Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination:The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEx.
L. REv. 1401, 1462-72 (1983).
274 See D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 11 (discussing, inter alia, Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623 (1887); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205 (1888)).
275 For cases in which due process figured in decisions striking down federal laws, see D.
CURRIE, supra note 28, chs. 8, 9 (discussing Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857);
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870)).
:76 94 U.S. 113 (1877), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 11.
277

Munn, 94 U.S. at 130-32.
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warned in dicta that "confiscatory" rate regulation would deprive
the owners of even such a business of property without due process
of law.2 78 Under Fuller, the Court continued to adhere to Munn's
fundamental principle, 27 9 but for the first time it struck down several state rate provisions on due process grounds.
The story begins with the famous Milwaukee Road case, 2 0 decided only two years after Fuller's appointment. This was apparently the first case in which the Court invalidated a state law
under the due process clause. The flaw the Justices perceived was a
procedural one: the statute made rates set by a commission, without hearing, conclusively reasonable in a judicial proceeding to enforce them. Precisely what was wrong with that was left somewhat
unclear by Justice Blatchford's brief and conclusory opinion. The
bulk of the argument seemed to suggest that the due process
clause guaranteed that a court determine the reasonable rate:
[The statute] deprives the company of its right to a judicial
investigation, by due process of law, under the forms and with
the machinery provided by the wisdom of successive ages for
the investigation judicially of the truth of a matter in controversy, and substitutes therefor, as an absolute finality, the action of a railroad commission which, in view of the powers
conceded to it by the state court, cannot be regarded as
clothed with judicial functions or possessing the machinery of
a court of justice ...
. . . The question of the reasonableness of a rate . . . is
eminently a question for judicial investigation, requiring due
process of law for its determination.2 8 1
Blatchford failed to identify just what the property was of
which the company had been deprived, saying only that it had lost
"the lawful use of its property. 21 8 2 As to why due process required
278Railroad

Comm'n Cases (Stone v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.), 116 U.S. 307, 331

(1886).
1, See, e.g., Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 543 (1892) (Blatchford, J.). Budd is a
wordy opinion that illustrates Justice Blatchford's practice of substituting long summaries
of prior cases for analysis. Cf. supra notes 206-17 and accompanying text (discussing
Fuller's similar style in Leisy v. Hardin). Two new Justices-Brewer and Brown-joined
Field in arguing that Munn should be overruled. 143 U.S. at 548-50. See also Brass v. North
Dakota ex rel. Stoeser, 153 U.S. 391, 403, 409-10 (1894) (Shiras, J.) (extending Munn, over
four dissenters, to a case in which there was no "practical monopoly").
180 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).

1 Id. at 457-58.
22 Id. at 458.
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a judicial investigation, he invoked only the mysterious "wisdom of
successive ages " 2 3-suggesting the purely historical test that had
been repudiated in Hurtado v. California2 4 -Without either citation or supporting reasons. Furthermore, he proceeded to cast
doubt on whether he really meant that due process required a
court decision by explaining why it was that the commission could
not be "regarded as clothed with judicial functions":
No hearing is provided for, no summons or notice to the company before the commission has found what it is to find and
declared what it is to declare, no opportunity provided for the
company to introduce witnesses before the commission, in
fact, nothing which has the semblance of due process of law
285

In short, the trouble was that the rate had been conclusively determined without a hearing before any governmental body;286 the case
holds neither that rates must be set in the first instance by a court
nor, as has sometimes been said,2 87 that administrative ratemaking
28 s
must always be subject to judicial review.
The right to a hearing had frequently been described as essential to due process 289 and could easily have been fitted into the
Hurtado test of fundamental procedural fairness.2 90 Even this narrow reading of the majority opinion, however, received a serious
and unanswered challenge in a dissent by that honest former railroad lawyer, Bradley: since the state legislature could have set

283
284
288
286

Id. at 457.
110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 11.
134 U.S. at 457.
See Porter, That Commerce Shall Be Free: A New Look at the Old Laissez-Faire

Court, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 135, 148.
287

See, e.g., L. BETH, supra note 165, at 179;

GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS

509 n.8 (10th ed. 1980).
288 See Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 507 (1903) (Brewer, J.) (allowing a state to give
an administrative agency final say in medical licensing: "[W]e know of no provision in the
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Federal Constitution which forbids a State from granting to a tribunal, whether called a
court or a board of registration, the final determination of a legal question.... Due process
is not necessarily judicial process."); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660
(1892) (Gray, J.) (unanimously allowing Congress to dispense with judicial review of an ex-

ecutive determination to deny an alien entry to the United States). Other decisions of the
period, indeed, tended to establish that the allocation of authority among branches of state
government in general was not of federal constitutional concern. See supra note 91 (discussing delegation of legislative power). For an excellent discussion of the question whether the
Constitution requires judicial review of federal administrative action, see Louis JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ch. 9 (1965).
288 See, e.g., Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1878) (dictum).
288 Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 535.

1985]

The Supreme Court: 1889-1910

rates without a hearing, why should a different rule apply to a
commission?2 9 '
Forty years later, the Court would suggest that the legislature's broad representative basis provided an adequate substitute
for the safeguards of an administrative hearing. 92 When administrative action is legislative rather than judicial in character, however, the Court has nevertheless refused to require a hearing.29 3 In
regard to the Court's reasons for this distinction, the action in Milwaukee Road was difficult to classify. That the rates applied only
to a single railroad reduced the effectiveness of the political checks
that constrain legislative rulemaking; that many potential customers were affected made it impracticable to give all those interested
a quasi-judicial hearing.29 4 Blatchford did not go into any of this,
and, within six years, the Court undermined the argument that
might have supported him by holding that the setting of rates for a
single railroad was beyond the power of the Interstate Commerce
Commission because it was a legislative and not a judicial func29 5
tion.
The best explanation of the Milwaukee Road decision was
suggested by the dependable Miller in a brief concurring opinion. 96 What Blatchford said was "judicial" was not ratemaking itself but the question of whether the rate set was reasonable. An
unreasonably low rate, the Court had already announced, would
take property without due process. 9 7 And, Miller said, a court

2" Milwaukee Road, 134 U.S. at 463-64 (Bradley, J., joined by Gray and Lamar, JJ.,
dissenting). Within two years, Blatchford himself wrote to uphold legislatively determined

rates without justifying the distinction. Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 546-47 (1892)
("What was said in [Milwaukee Road] as to the question of the reasonableness of the rate of
charge being one for judicial investigation, had no reference to a case where the rates are
prescribed directly by the legislature.").
212 Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190, 197 (1933) ("In theory, at least, the legislature acts upon adequate knowledge after full consideration and through members who represent the entire public.").
293 Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (Holmes, J.) (a
rule of conduct that applies to "more than a few people" need not be formulated pursuant
to judicial-type hearing); see BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 5.6-5.9 (2d ed.
1984).
2" In Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915),
Holmes emphasized the impracticability problem and the effectiveness of the political
check. See also Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1306-07 (10th Cir. 1973) (upholding administrative rulemaking applicable to a single company, without quasi-judicial
hearing).
295 ICC v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T. Pac. Ry., 167 U.S. 479, 499, 506, 511 (1897) (Brewer,
J.). Only Justice Harlan dissented.
216Milwaukee Road, 134 U.S. at 459-61 (Miller, J., concurring).
2,,Railroad Comm'n Cases (Stone v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.), 116 U.S. 307, 331
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could not be required to enforce a legislatively determined rate
298
without a prior judicial determination of its constitutionality.
This conclusion seems compelled by the supremacy clause, which
requires state courts to follow the Constitution, "any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding"; 29 9 f6r the state court to accept the commission's determina-

tion of that issue was contrary to the principle of Marbury v.
Madison.30 0

The Court badly mangled the difficult procedural problem
presented by the Milwaukee Road case, but it still had not struck
down a state-set rate on substantive grounds.3 0 1 It did just that in
a series of decisions culminating in Smyth v. Ames3 0 2 in 1898, a
(1886).

298 Milwaukee Road, 134 U.S.
299 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

at 460 (Miller, J., concurring).

300 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) ("If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is. superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution,
and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply."); cf. Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 468 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("whenever the judicial
power is called into play, it is responsible directly to the fundamental law"); United States
v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146-47 (1872) (legislature may not forbid the Court "to give
the effect to evidence which, in its own judgment, such evidence should have").
301 In other due-process decisions, the Fuller Court did not display a marked tendency
to insist upon procedures satisfying modern notions of fair play. See, e.g., Oceanic Steam
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 340-43 (1909) (White, J.) (upholding statute
authorizing fines to be levied, without a hearing, against companies landing illegal aliens, on
the ground that Congress had "absolute power. . . over the right to bring aliens into the
United States"); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 463 (1907) (Holmes, J.) (allowing
judge to try defendant for impugning judge's own honesty through articles and cartoons);
Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 260 (1907) (McKenna, J.) (upholding service of process by
publication on a nonresident landowner); Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123, 129-30 (1906)
(Peckham, J.) (holding it permissible to try a deaf person for a crime without repeating
testimony into his ear trumpet); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729-30
(1893) (Gray, J.) (upholding a statute placing the burden on a Chinese alien to show he was
not deportable and disqualifying Chinese witnesses on the ground that Congress had detected a problem of false testimony among Chinese). The Court had not yet adopted fairness as the test of due process, but neither did it say that all of the above procedures were
sanctioned by history. But see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 145-48 (1908) (Peckham, J.)
(holding that the necessity to risk prohibitive penalties in order to test the validity of a rate
regulation was the equivalent of denying a hearing entirely); see also Lawton v. Steele, 152
U.S. 133 (1894) (Brown, J.), and North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S.
306 (1908) (Peckham, J.) (upholding, respectively, the seizure of illegal fish nets and the
destruction of spoiled food without prior hearings, relying in the first case on history, in the
second on precedent, and in both on necessity; and making clear in both that the owner was
entitled to a hearing in a subsequent tort suit against the offending officer).
302 169 U.S. 466 (1898). Smyth had been preceded by Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 154 U.S. 362, 397-99 (1894) (Brewer, J.), a diversity case in which the precise source of
the law applied was not clarified and in whih due process was mentioned only in a quotation from an earlier case, and by Covington & Lexington Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164
U.S. 578, 591-92 (1896) (Harlan, J.), which held it error to dismiss a complaint alleging that
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Harlan opinion reaffirming dicta to the effect that a rate not permitting a reasonable return on the value of railroad property was
unconstitutional. It did so after a painful reexamination of the
complex financial record30 3 that boded ill for the future state of the
docket. It did so, moreover, without serious consideration of the
fundamental question whether the due process clause had anything
to do with the reasonableness of rates set by the states for railroads. Substantive due process had come of age without having
been properly born.
B. Allgeyer v. Louisiana
The year before Smyth, in 1897, the Court had unanimously
taken another long step toward giving the due process clause a
substantive dimension and had given the term "liberty" in that
clause a broad construction in the bargain. 304 The suit was brought
by the state to collect a penalty for violation of a statute that prohibited acts taken within the state to insure property then in the
State through "any marine insurance company which has not complied in all respects with the laws of this State. ' 305 The act in question was the mailing of a notice advising a New York insurer of a
shipment of cotton from New Orleans to be insured pursuant to an
existing contract.3 06 The opinion consisted of a pair of bare conclusions by Justice Peckham, a newcomer who was to make quite a
name for himself in this field. The result was that the state law
could not constitutionally be applied.
Peckham first concluded, solely on the basis of prior conclusory dicta, that the freedom to give notice under an insurance
policy was within the "liberty" protected by the fourteenth
amendment:
The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the
right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint
of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to
embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of
all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to
live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that

rates had been set below costs, and which explicitly invoked due process.
301Smyth, 169 U.S. at 528-50.
304 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
305 Id. at 579.
306 Id.
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purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned. 07
This, of course, is not what was provided in Magna Charta, from
which the due process clause had been derived, 30 8 but Peckham did
not pause to justify his momentous and latitudinous interpretation; thus liberty of contract found its way into the Constitution by
30 9
bald fiat.
On the question whether the Louisiana statute afforded "due
process of law" in depriving the defendants of that liberty,
Peckham did no better:
Such a statute as this in question is not due process of law,
because it prohibits an act which under the Federal Constitution the defendants had a right to perform ...
. . . [A]lthough it may be conceded that this right to contract in relation to persons or property or to do business
within the jurisdiction of the State may be regulated and
sometimes prohibited when the contracts or business conflict
with the policy of the State as contained in its statutes, yet
the power does not and cannot extend to prohibiting a citizen
from making contracts of the nature involved in this case
outside of the limits and jurisdiction of the State, and which
are also to be performed outside of such jurisdiction; nor can
the State legally prohibit its citizens from doing such an act as
writing this letter of notification, even though the property
which is the subject of the insurance may at the time when
310
such insurance attaches be within the limits of the State.
One searches the opinion in vain for either reasons or authority in support of this edict. It is clear enough that what moved the
Id. at 589.
See 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES 50-55 (London 1642) (discussing the derivation of
the term "due process" from Magna Charta); Hand, Due Process of Law and the EightHour Day, 21 HAIv. L. REV. 495, 495 (1908) (to construe the term "liberty" to include liberty of contract is "to disregard the whole juristic history of the word"); Shattuck, The True
Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions
Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property",4 HARV. L. REV. 365, 372-73 (1891) ("liberty"
in Magna Charta referred only to freedom from imprisonment).
309 Contrast the Court's almost contemporaneous decision that a public office was not
"property" within the due process clause. Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 576-77 (1900)
(Fuller, C.J.) (relying on contract-clause precedents).
310 Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 591-92. The first sentence of this passage is circular, since the
due process clause itself was the only provision invoked as the source of the constitutional
right to contract.
307
3o8
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Court was what it perceived as the extraterritorial application of
state law and not the substance of the law in general.3 1" Apparently, the due process clause had become the constitutional peg on
which to hang Justice Story's territorialist choice-of-law views,312
which had occasionally crept into pre-fourteenth-amendment con3 13
stitutional decisions without any pretense of textual pedigree.
Unfortunately, the Court did not say why a theory that limited
states to the regulation of acts within their borders forbade Louisiana to attach consequences to the mailing of a letter from New
Orleans.3 1 ' More important, Peckham never bothered to explain
why he thought the due process clause had anything to do with
territorial theory or with choice of law in general.31 5 ,
The Court might have made a plausible case by analogy to
Pennoyer v. Neff,31 6 which had said that due process of law incor3,1 In addition to the reservation in the quoted passage. See id. at 586-88 (distinguishing Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895), in which the Court had upheld a similar law
as applied to contracts made within the state).
3, See generally JOSEPH STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (Boston 1834).
3'3 See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 654-55 (1829) (Story, J.) ("The
legislative and judicial authority of New Hampshire were bounded by the territory of that
state, and could not be rightfully exercised to pass estates lying in another state.").
, All that Peckham said was that the mailing of the notice was "collateral" to the
contract. Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 592.
311 Allgeyer's territorial thesis was appropriately invoked, though without citation of
the case itself, in explaining the Fuller Court's related principle that due process forbade
extraterritorial taxation as well. See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S.
194, 204 (1905) (Brown, J.) ("Not only is the operation of state laws limited to persons and
property within the boundaries of the State, but property which is wholly and exclusively
within the jurisdiction of another State, receives none of the protection for which the tax is
supposed to be the compensation."). For the latter reason, such a tax was also held to be an
uncompensated taking of property. Id. at 202-03. From the standpoint of territorial theory,
it is interesting that the Court in Union Refrigeratorfocused exclusively on the situs of the
property, relying in part upon the risk of multiple taxation, in spite of the fact that the
taxpayer was a domestic corporation. Id. at 210-11. Justice Holmes's dissent seems, after
Allgeyer, to have come too late: "It seems to me that the result reached by the court probably is a desirable one, but I hardly understand how it can be deduced from the Fourteenth

Amendment ....

"

Union Refrigerator, 199 U.S. at 211 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

Also of lasting significance was the split decision in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas
ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 34-38 (1910) (Harlan, J.), which held on the authority of cases
respecting surrender of the right to remove cases to federal court, e.g., Insurance Co. v.
Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874), that a state had no power to condition the right to do
local business on the payment of an extraterritorial tax. Justice Holmes again dissented,
invoking contrary authority and arguing that the company had made a voluntary agreement.
Western Union, 216 U.S. at 52-56; cf. D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 13 (discussing the issue
of unconstitutional conditions on public employment and Holmes's own famous remark, in
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892), that there
was "no constitutional right to be a policeman."); GERARD HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 132-47 (1918).
3.6 95 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1878) (dictum), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 11.
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porated traditional territorial limits on service of process.3

17

It

might also have made something of the relation between due process and Magna Charta's "law of the land" provision, the text and
purpose of which arguably required that cases be decided according to the law applicable at the time and place of the transaction.318 The point is not that Allgeyer was obviously wrong, but
that Peckham made not the slightest effort to justify his pathbreaking and by no means inevitable conclusions.3 19
C. Lochner v. New York

In any event, Allgeyer was a choice-of-law decision, not,
strictly speaking, a substantive one. In a series of decisions during
the ensuing eight years, the Court emphasized the distinction by
upholding a great variety of state and federal laws despite the argument that they unduly restricted the newly minted liberty of
contract: limitations on the hours to be worked by miners 32 0 and
by employees of public contractors, 21 prohibitions of various con31 The force of this argument, however, had been impaired by rejection of a strict historical test of due process in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), discussed in D.
CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 11. Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U.S. 193 (1899) (Peckham, J.),
provides an interesting bridge connecting later tax cases like Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Kansas ex rel. Coleman (discussed supra note 315) with the established principle that due
process restricted the application of judicial power to persons within the state. In Dewey,
the Court struck down the personal assessment of taxes against a nonresident landowner,
citing Pennoyerto invalidate the assessment "judgment" and generalizing that "jurisdiction
to tax exists only in regard to persons and property or upon the business done within the
State." Dewey, 173 U.S. at 203.
318 Both of Peckham's conclusions in Allgeyer had been anticipated by the dissenting
Justices in Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 661-63 (1895) (Harlan, J., joined by Brewer
and Jackson, JJ., dissenting). These dissenters gave no reason for their conclusions either.
For an effort to explain Allgeyer in terms of modern governmental-interest analysis, while
rejecting its "conceptualism," see BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAws 241-42 (1963).
'19 For the Court's indifference to the plausible argument that due process required
application of the law governing at the time of the transaction, see United States v.
Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S. 370 (1907) (White, J.) (allowing Congress retroactively to ratify a
tariff that the President had imposed without authority). Similar considerations of protecting legitimate expectations argue against both extraterritoriality and retroactivity, but to
hold that due process barred all retroactive laws would make the ex post facto clause of
article I, section 9 redundant. For the argument that, prior to ratification of the fourteenth
amendment, state decisions had established that due process limited retroactivity but not
extraterritoriality, see Whitten, The ConstitutionalLimitations on State Choice of Law:
Due Process, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 851, 902-04 (1982). On the ex post facto clauses themselves, see the Court's grisly inquiry into whether a statute that retroactively lengthened the
period of imprisonment prior to hanging increased or decreased the punishment in Rooney
v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 325 (1905) (Harlan, J.) (upholding the law).
320 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (Brown, J.).
321 Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903) (Harlan, J.).
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tracts in restraint of trade, 22 of charging more for shorter than for
longer rail journeys, 323 of speculation in grain futures s24 and 32of6
margin sales, 325 and of paying sailors wages in advance of service.
A few relatively trivial state actions, to be sure, were struck down
32 7
on what were unmistakably substantive due process grounds;
but as late as 1905 that doctrine seemed to pose no great threat to
state or federal
legislation. 28 Then the Court decided Lochner v.
3 29
York.
New
Once again it was Peckham who wrote, reversing Lochner's
conviction under a statute that prohibited employing a baker for
more than sixty hours in one week. The statute failed as a health
measure because the baking trade was not sufficiently unhealthy to
322Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447, 456-57 (1905) (Brewer, J.) (contract in restraint of
trade); Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204-06 (1904) (Holmes, J.) (conspiracy to injure
business maliciously); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 228-29
(1899) (Peckham, J.) (market division); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505,
572-73 (1898) (Peckham, J.) (conspiracy to fix rail rates).
2'3 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503, 510-16 (1902) (Shiras, J.).
32, Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425, 430-31 (1902) (Harlan, J.).
325 Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609-10 (1903) (Holmes, J.).
32 Patterson v. The Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 174-75 (1903) (Brewer, J.). The Court
had similarly allowed significant restrictions of property rights by substantive legislation.
See, e.g., St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U.S. 203, 207, 209-11 (1902) (Brown, J.)
(state may inspect mine at owner's cost); Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 210-11
(1900) (White, J.) (upholding criminal penalty imposed on owners of gas wells for wasting
gas); cf. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905) (Harlan, J.) (upholding compulsory vaccination).
M Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 239-40 (1904) (Day, J.) (invalidating prohibition without reason of gas works authorized by permit); Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Smith,
173 U.S. 684, 698-99 (1899) (Peckham, J.) (invalidating requirement that railroad sell 1000mile ticket at cut rate); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (Gray, J.)
(invalidating order allowing others to build grain elevator on railroad property: "The taking
...of the private property of one person ... for the private use of another, is not due
process of law. . .

."); see

also supra notes 276-303 and accompanying text (discussing the

rate cases); cf. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269 (1898) (Harlan, J.) (invalidating as an uncompensated taking a special assessment not apportioned to benefits, after the Court had
held that the due process clause made the taking clause applicable to the states).
328 For a survey of pre-Lochner state decisions upholding regulations, see Seager, The
Attitude of American Courts Towards Restrictive Labor Laws, 19 Po. Sci. Q. 589 (1904). In
Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430, 437-41 (1904) (Fuller, C.J.), the Court had cut
back sharply on the protection afforded by due process in its original sense by holding,
contrary to the thrust of the old jury cases of the 1880's, see D. CURME, supra note 28, ch. 11
(discussing Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880) (dictum); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 347 (1880)), that action of a state officer unauthorized by state law was not state action
for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. See also the peculiar and unexplained holdings
in Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906) (Harlan, J.), and
Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907) (Harlan, J.), that, although a
corporation had long been held a "person" within the fourteenth amendment, it had no
"liberty" protected by the due process clause.
3.9 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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justify regulation 330 and as "a purely labor law" because there was
"no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence
and capacity to men in other trades. . . or. . . not able to assert
their rights and care for themselves."33 '
In light of the precedents, it was not surprising that four Justices dissented. Holmes called attention to the decisions sustaining
the eight-hour workday for miners and the ban on margin sales, in
both of which, as in the ancient example of usury laws, individuals
3 32
had been protected against the risk of their own improvidence.
Harlan, joined by White and Day, graphically demolished the
Court's unsubstantiated conclusion on the health question by documenting the dangers of constant physical exertion under exposure
to extreme heat and flour dust and by reporting flatly that bakers
"'seldom live over their fiftieth year.' "
The Court made only the most perfunctory attempt to deal
with precedent, 33 4 and it was obvious that it was applying a far
stricter level of scrutiny than it had applied in previous cases.3 35
Id. at 59.
3S1Id. at 57. Peckham and Brewer had dissented from Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366
(1898), where a similar law for miners had been upheld. For an example of contemporaneous
approval of Lochner, see 21 CENT. L.J. 402, 403 (1905) ("The Supreme Court ... in exalting
the individual's right of contract has once more, indeed, justified its right to be called the
great 'bulwark of the liberties of the people.' ").
"3 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75. Holmes cited Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606 (1903) (margin
sales), and Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (eight-hour day for miners), and added the
famous aphorism, "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Other precedents allowing similar protection from one's own freedom of contract outside the area of health or safety included Louisville & N.R.R. v. Kentucky, 183 U.S.
503, 510-16 (1902) (upholding prohibition of higher shipping rates for short than for long
hauls), and Patterson v. The Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 174-75 (1903) (upholding prohibition of prepayment of sailors' wages). Peckham attempted to distinguish neither these cases
nor Otis.
333 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 70-71 (quoting from a study of workers' diseases); see Hand,
supra note 308, at 502 ("It seems very strange that a court should have decided that the
limit of eight hours had in fact no such relation" to health.).
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898), the eight-hour day for miners case, was distinguished on the grounds that the New York law had no emergency provision-an objection Lochner should have lacked standing to raise since he alleged no emergency defense-and that Holden had decided only that the nature of mining was such as to make
regulation appropriate. Peckham did not say why; presumably he meant mining was more
dangerous than baking. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903), which upheld an eight-hour
day for those employed by or on behalf of the state, was distinguished on the conclusory
ground that the state had the right to declare the conditions of work done under public
contracts. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 54-55.
See Cushman, The Social and Economic Interpretationof the Fourteenth Amendment, 20 MICH. L. REv. 737, 749 (1922) (saying of the decisions of the Lochner period, "The
time-honored doctrine that laws are presumed to be valid until proved beyond all reasonable doubt to be otherwise seemed to be forgotten or ignored."); Dodd, The Growth of Judi330

334

335
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To quibble over the result of the particular case, however, is to
miss the main point. Harlan himself had contributed as much as
anyone else to the rise of substantive due process with his 1887
opinion upholding a state liquor law only because it was a reasonable exercise of the police power3ss Once it had been established in
dictum that unreasonable laws would offend due process, it was
only a matter of opinion which laws were unreasonable.
Thus, although on its facts Lochner was a notable break with
precedent, in the larger sense it was the predictable outgrowth of a
long and consistent development. By the time the case was decided, nobody argued that due process was not a limitation on the
legislature, that it related only to procedure, or that it applied only
to punishment for crime.117 All the Justices agreed that the Constitution made the Court what Miller had so vehemently denied in
Davidson v. New Orleans:s33 censor of the reasonableness of all
laws.33 9 They did so, moreover, without ever justifying their improbable conclusion.
It is important to emphasize that Lochner did not usher in a
reign of terror for social legislation. Apart from Harlan's own conclusion, in Adair v. United States,3 ' 0 that a state could not forbid
the discharge of an employee for belonging to a union, the Court
not only continued to uphold most challenged regulations 34 1 but
cial Power, 24 POL. ScI. Q. 193, 194 (1909) (presumption of constitutionality, after Lochner,
just "a mere courteous and smoothly transmitted platitude"). Compare Lochner with, e.g.,
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888) (Harlan, J.) (accepting a flimsy health justification in upholding a ban on the sale of margarine), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch.
11.
3 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 11;
see also L. BETH, supra note 165, at 178 ("after Mugler the Court had accepted the whole
concept of substantive due process"). Harlan had also written Smyth v. Ames, which struck
down railroad rates on substantive due process grounds. See supra notes 302-03 and accompanying text.
1-1 There were powerful arguments for each of these positions. See D. CURRIE, supra
note 28, chs. 8, 9, 11.
338 96 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1878), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 11.
13,See Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH.L. REv.
643, 670-71 (1909).
3O 208 U.S. 161, 172-76 (1908) (alternative holding). McKenna and Holmes dissented.
The majority opinion contains no reasoning worth mentioning. Adair's alternative commerce-clause holding is discussed supra note 164 and accompanying text.
" For comments challenging the "laissez-faire" characterization of the Fuller Court,
see Dodd, Social Legislation and the Courts, 28 POL. SCL Q. 1, 5 (1913); Porter, supra note
286, at 140-41; Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court,_.13
COLUM. L. REv. 294 (1913). For a statistical summary of the Court's work in this area, see 1
C. WARREN, supra note 29, at 741-42. Numbers, of course, do not tell the whole story: "a
single decision may decide the fate of many measures." F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 139, at
106. Numerous state-court invalidations of social legislation before and after Lochner are
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went so far as to sustain a maximum-hour law for women in
Muller v. Oregon.34 2 Substantive due process had finally shown
that it had teeth,3 43 but two serious bites in twenty years should

not obscure the fact that most laws passing3 through its den during
the Fuller period did not get bitten at all. "
D. Suing State Officers
Lochner itself reached the Supreme Court on review of a state
criminal conviction. To test the constitutionality of a law by violating it, however, is a risky business, rightly compared by a later obdiscussed and criticized in Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 462-84 (1909); see
also Dodd, supra, at 16 (Supreme Court "has on the whole been more liberal than the state
-courts in dealing with new social and industrial legislation").
342 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (Brewer, J.) (relying on the "disadvantage" at which "woman's physical structure and . . . maternal functions place her" and the importance of
healthy mothers "to preserve the strength and vigor of the race"). This was the case in
which the original "Brandeis brief" was filed. Encouraged perhaps by Harlan's use of medical treatises in Lochner, it figured prominently in the Court's opinion. See Muller, 208 U.S.
at 419.
I" The equal protection clause was more sparingly used. Most attacks on economic
classifications were dismissed perfunctorily with, at most, a reference to the reasonableness
of the classification. The rare exceptions striking down such laws merely illustrated the capriciousness of the Court's criteria. Compare Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897)
(Brewer, J.) (state may not impose attorney fees only upon railroads in actions for livestock
losses), with Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96 (1899) (Brewer, J.) (state may
impose attorney fees only upon railroads in actions for fires); compare Cotting v. Kansas
City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79 (1901) (Brewer, J.) (state may not limit rate regulation to
larger stockyards), with St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U.S. 203 (1902) (Brown,
J.) (state may limit inspection to mines employing more than five workers); compare Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902) (Harlan, J.) (state may not exempt
agricultural producers from its antitrust law), with Tullis v. Lake Erie & W.R.R., 175 U.S.
348 (1899) (Fuller, C.J.) (state may abolish fellow-servant rule for railroads only). Of over
100 cases attacking nonracial classifications during the Fuller period, Ellis, Cotting, and
Connolly are virtually the only ones in which a denial of equal protection was found. For the
argument that these cases "roughly tracked" the simultaneous development of substantive
due process, see Kay, The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court, 1873-1903, 29
BUFFALO L. REV. 667, 668 (1980).
"I One of the most interesting cases not yet mentioned was Sentell v. New Orleans &
C.R.R., 166 U.S. 698 (1897) (Brown J.), in which the Court upheld a law that denied a tort
remedy against those who killed unlicensed dogs on the strange ground that dogs, unlike
cattle, were not really property. The Court thus seemed to imply that the due process clause
imposed an affirmative duty on the state to protect anything that was really property. This
is an idea of freedom that has made much headway in West German constitutional law but
has been basically rejected in our own, see, e.g., Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200,
1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) ("[T]he Constitution is a charter of negative rather than
positive liberties."), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1325 (1984). Compare, e.g., Judgment of Feb.
25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, Federal Republic of Germany, 39 BVerfG 1 (interpreting provisions requiring government to "protect. . . the right to life" to require that abortion be made in most instances a crime), with Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (state
has no duty to subsidize abortions that it may not forbid).
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to determining whether a mushroom is poisonous by eating
it.34 5 If substantive due process was to be given full scope, a more
adequate remedy had to be found. Brushing aside the maxim that
equity would not enjoin criminal proceedings3 46 as inapplicable in
cases of irreparable harm, the Court found the solution by allowing
suits to enjoin government officers from enforcing unconstitutional
3 47
laws.
The constitutional obstacle to this course was sovereign immunity, embodied in part in the eleventh amendment and, as we have
3 48
seen, found by the Fuller Court in Hans v. Louisiana
to be im4
9
plicit in article III as well
Ever since Marshall, the Court had
held these limitations inapplicable to suits against state or federal
officers whose actions were such as to make them personally liable
for harm.3 50 But a series of contract-clause decisions in the Waite
years had made it clear that an officer could not be sued unless he
personally had committed a wrong, and In re Ayers had squarely
held that an attorney general who sued to enforce an unconstitutional debt to the state committed no personal wrong.3 51
Ayers had been decided in 1887. Within seven years, in Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,3 52 the Court began to ignore
it. 353 Affirming an injunction against proceedings to enforce rates
'" See DeclaratoryJudgments:Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1928) (statement of Prof. Borchard).
346 See, e.g., In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 209-11 (1888) (Gray, J.).
M See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 161-65 (1908); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466,
515-19 (1898). The right to an injunction was significant also because the seventh amendment seemed to preclude de novo reexamination of a jury finding that a prescribed rate was
reasonable. Cf. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 242-46 (1897) (Harlan, J.)
(jury finding that compensation for taking under eminent domain power was "just" cannot
be reexamined on appeal).
38 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
34, See supra notes 30-46 and accompanying text.
310 See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); United
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1885).
3.. 123 U.S. 443, 504-06 (1887). For discussion of this and earlier cases, see D. CURRIE,
supra note 28, chs. 6, 12.
3.2 154 U.S. 362 (1894).
353 Indeed, as early as 1891, in reaffirming the governing principle that officers could be
sued if they "commit acts of wrong and injury to the rights and property of the plaintiff,"
the Court unanimously twisted it by upholding an injunction against an officer who was
about to sell land that had already been contracted to someone else. Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891) (Lamar, J.). The ground given was that the officer's acts were
"violative of [the plaintiff's] contract," id. at 18, though Ayers had made clear that an officer could not be liable for breach of the state's contract, to which he was not a party. The
result can be reconciled with Ayers on the ground that the officer had committed a tort by
interfering with the plaintiff's equitable title to the land. See D. CuRRIE, supra note 28, ch.
10 (discussing the similar case of Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203 (1873)).
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set by a railroad commission, Justice Brewer argued that the suit
was no more against the state than a suit "restraining the collection of taxes, 3 54 without acknowledging that Ayers had been just
such a suit. He reduced the force of this conclusion by adding that
the state had waived its immunity.3 55 Without even citing Reagan,
however, Justice Harlan followed its broader assertion in the simi35 7
lar 1898 case of Smyth v. Ames.3 56 With one notable exception,
later decisions of the Fuller period continued to follow this line
without recognizing its inconsistency with Ayers,3 58 until the textbook 1908 case of Ex parte Young. 59
Young was yet another suit to enjoin a state officer from enforcing allegedly confiscatory rate provisions; this time, in a long
and lonely dissent, 6 0 Justice Harlan rediscovered In re Ayers. It
was, of course, too late. Harlan had never protested while the
Court repeatedly disregarded that decision, and he had written the
contrary opinion in Smyth v. Ames himself.3 6 ' Forced to justify a
3" Reagan, 154 U.S. at 390. Brewer added, rightly enough in light of the underlying
theory, that it was immaterial whether the statute setting up the commission was constitutional: if the commissioners "go beyond the powers thereby conferred .... the fact that
they are assuming to act under a valid law will not oust the courts of jurisdiction to restrain
their excessive and illegal acts." Id. at 391; see also Scully v. Bird, 209 U.S. 481, 490 (1908)
(McKenna, J.) (allowing an injunction against a state officer in a diversity case, with no
mention of any constitutional claim, on the ground that the officer had acted "in dereliction
of duties enjoined by the statutes of the State").
3" Reagan, 154 U.S. at 391-92. Brewer relied on a statute authorizing suit against the
commission "in a court of competent jurisdiction in Travis County, Texas," which the Court
construed to embrace federal as well as state courts. Later cases would require more explicit
consent to be sued in federal courts. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 577 (1946).
38 169 U.S. 466 (1898). Saying only that it was "settled doctrine.
. . that a suit against
individuals for the purpose of preventing them as officers of a State from enforcing an unconstitutional enactment to the injury of the rights of the plaintiff, is not a suit against the
State," id. at 518-19, Harlan slid right over the clear distinction drawn in the contractclause cases between seizure of the plaintiff's property, which was a tort, and suit against
the plaintiff, which was not.
M Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 525-29 (1899) (Harlan, J.) (following Ayers); see also
Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 445 (1900) (Harlan, J.) (holding suit for a refund from state
treasury to be a suit against state because it sought "to compel an officer. . . to perform or
comply with the promise of the State").
:58See, e.g., McNeill v. Southern Ry., 202 U.S. 543, 559 (1906) (White, J.); Prout v.
Starr, 188 U.S. 537, 542-43 (1903) (Shiras, J.). At the same time, in Belknap v. Schild, 161
U.S. 10, 25 (1896) (Gray, J.), the Court seemed inconsistently to cut back on prior decisions
permitting officers to be sued by holding that the United States was an indispensable party
to a suit to enjoin federal officers from using government property in infringement of a
patent, though the Court conceded that the officers could be held personally liable for
damages.
:59 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
360 Id. at 168-204.
3 1 He had also dissented in Ayers, 123 U.S. at 510.
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position that, in time-hallowed fashion, he refused to concede was
new,3 62 Justice Peckham acknowledged that the officer must be
personally liable for some wrong but asserted, without explanation,
that the threat of suit under an unconstitutional statute was
"equivalent to any other threatened wrong or injury to the property of a plaintiff."36 3 The new rule was that officers clothed with
enforcement duties "who threaten and are about to commence proceedings . . . to enforce . . . an unconstitutional
act . . . may be
' 4
36
equity.
of
court
Federal
a
by
enjoined
The parties in Young were not of diverse citizenship; jurisdiction was based on the theory that the case was one arising under
the Constitution.6 5 To modern eyes, this theory seems obviously
correct since the complaint alleged that the defendant threatened
to deprive the plaintiff of property without due process of law. In
explaining why the suit was not one against the state, however, the
Court enunciated a thesis wholly inconsistent with this approach:
If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce
be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case
stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual
conduct. 6
If the officer was "stripped of his official.

. .

character," he could

362 Ayers was distinguished, without revealing its facts or reasoning, on the basis of the
misleading half-truth that the relief sought there would have "constitute[d] a performance
by the State of the alleged contract of the State," 209 U.S. at 151. This had been equally
true in Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 279-80 (1885), where suit had nevertheless
been allowed; the true difference was that the seizure of the plaintiff's property in
Poindexter was a tort and the threatened suit in Ayers was not. Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S.
516 (1899), the one later decision that followed Ayers's reasoning, was distinguished on the
basis of unfortunate language in the Fitts opinion that seemed unnecessarily to rest the
decision on the fact that the officer sued had no particular duties under the challenged
statute. Young, 209 U.S. at 156-58; see C. WRIGHT, supra note 40, at 288 (Ayers "would
seem to be decisive of the Young litigation").
31- 209 U.S. at 158; see also id. at 160 ("It would be an injury to complainant to harass
it with a multiplicity of suits or litigation generally in an endeavor to enforce penalties
under an unconstitutional enactment ....

"). But even today only malicious prosecutions

are actionable, and at the time of Young, the tort had apparently not been extended to civil
cases at all. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 120, at 889-92 (5th ed. 1984) (collecting cases).
3" 209 U.S. at 156. For the hostile reaction to Young, see 2 C. WARREN, supra note 29,
at 717.
361 209 U.S. at 143-45.
366 Id. at 159-60.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[52:324

not violate the due process clause, which applies only to state action.3 67 Peckham did not attempt to justify this contradiction.3 68
The alternative argument-that the fourteenth amendment was
relevant only to defeat the defense of official authority369 -- would
have been insufficient to sustain federal jurisdiction under the rule
of Louisville & Nashville Railway v. Mottley,37 0 which held that
the federal nature of the case must appear from the plaintiff's
statement of his own claim.371
Thus Peckham bungled the jurisdictional questions in Ex
parte Young as badly as he had the more substantive issues in Allgeyer and in Lochner, and significant new doctrine was established
without explanation. And thus the economic decisions of the Fuller
Court ended as they had begun, with a groundbreaking pronouncement on the ancillary question of sovereign immunity. As Hans
had gone beyond the eleventh amendment to help bury an explicit
constitutional safeguard for economic interests with which the
Court had little sympathy, Young rejected sound precedent to help
realize a new and more flexible safeguard that the Court manufac72
tured out of whole cloth.
387

The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (fourteenth amendment applies only to

state action); see C. WRIGHT, supra note 40, at 289-90 (noting the anomaly in Young); Note,
50 HARV. L. REV. 956, 960-61 (1937) (same).
368 There was no such contradiction in the original theory; the officer was suable not
because he had violated the Constitution but because he had committed a common law tort.
369This theory may be inferred from the Court's statement that "[t]he State has no
power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the
United States." Young, 209 U.S. at 160.
370 211 U.S. 149, 153 (1908). This rule was at least as old as Houston & T.C.R.R. v.
Texas, 177 U.S. 66, 78 (1900) (Peckham, J.). See Note, supra note 367, at 961 n.40 (arguing
that Young and its progeny may create an implied exception to the Mottley rule).
37 Indeed, in one of the Virginia Coupon Cases, the Court had already held that an
analytically similar claim invoking the contract clause did not come within the provision of
the Civil Rights Act, now 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), that creates a cause of action for deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution. Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1885),
discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 12.
371 On the same day Young was decided, the Court also held, with Harlan alone protesting, that a state could not invoke sovereign immunity to close its own courts to a suit to
enjoin an officer from committing a wrong under color of an allegedly unconstitutional statute. General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 228 (1908) (McKenna, J.) ("It being then the
right of a party to be protected against a law which violates a constitutional right, . . . a
decision which denies such protection gives effect to the law, and the decision is reviewable
by this court."). Prior decisions cited by the Court itself, however, had unmistakably held
that a want of jurisdiction under state law was an adequate and independent ground for
refusing relief and thus precluded Supreme Court review. Id. at 221-24; cf. id. at 232-34
(Harlan, J., concurring); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 634-35 (1875)
(enunciating independent-and-adequate-state-ground rule). The Crain Court supported its
conclusion with an argument from intolerable consequences: "If a suit against state officers
is precluded in the national courts by the Eleventh Amendment... ,and may be forbidden
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CONCLUSION

The center of constitutional battle during the Fuller period
was the clash of economic interests, and it was characterized by
striking contrasts. While the sugar-trust case gave the commerce
power an artificially narrow reading, the Court invited Congress to
regulate anything it pleased under the guise of a tax, upheld congressional authority over aliens without reference to the enumeration of powers, and allowed the courts to issue injunctions not authorized by statute. The due process clause was employed for the
first time to invalidate unreasonable rates, extraterritorial legislation, and the bakers' ten-hour workday law; but the Court upheld
most similar measures and cut back sharply on the protection afforded by the contract clause. Sovereign immunity was broadened
to forbid suits by citizens against their own states and narrowed to
permit more suits against state officers.
Some of the apparent inconsistencies suggest a tendency to
favor business interests, as when the Court held that the Sherman
Act could validly reach labor boycotts but not combinations of
manufacturers.3 73 As a guardian of business, however, the Fuller
Court cannot be described as very successful; the great bulk of
business-limiting measures that it addressed were upheld.
The economic decisions of the Fuller years were not characterized by great respect for precedent. Leisy v. Hardin overruled the
License Cases. In re Rahrer evaded Cooley's express declaration

by a State to its courts .... an easy way is open to prevent the enforcement of many provi-

sions of the Constitution ... ." 209 U.S. at 226. The most obvious flaw in this contention
was that Young had just reaffirmed that a federal suit was not precluded; even if the substantive constitutional provisions invoked by the plaintiff implied that some court must be
open to grant an injunction, they seemed satisfied by the availability of a federal remedy.
See Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 35 STAN. L. REv.
1033, 1096 (1983). Moreover, the notion that the Constitution gave a "right. . .to be protected" by injunction was a giant step beyond Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 3, which had held only that a court had to

obey the Constitution when it had jurisdiction. Indeed, the Court had implicitly rejected
Crain's thesis in Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527 (1858) (holding that a state did

not have to permit itself to be sued in its own courts to redress a violation of the contract
clause, although sovereign immunity evidently would have barred a federal remedy as well).
By emphasizing Marbury's explanation that judicial review was indispensable to the effectu-

ation of constitutional limitations, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178, and the inadequacy of having to
wait to challenge a state law as a defendant in an enforcement proceeding, one might make
a respectable argument for overruling Beers. Cf. D. CURRIE, supra note 28, ch. 9 (discussing
Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869)).
373Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 308-09 (1908); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. 1, 12 (1895); see ROBERT McCLosKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 127 (1960)

("[T]he Court's chief concern was to defend the principle of laissez faire[,] and ...both
nationalist and localist doctrine were being pressed to subserve that end.").
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that Congress could not allow states to regulate commerce. The Income Tax case essentially overruled two earlier decisions. Ex parte
Young was inconsistent with In re Ayers. And, without fanfare, the
Court basically abandoned the uniformity test that had, for half a
century, figured so prominently in cases regarding state power over
commerce. Typically, the Justices seldom acknowledged that they
were departing from precedent. Even Leisy blamed the demise of
the License Cases on an intervening decision-one in which the
Court had done its best to pretend that it was not disturbing the
prior law.
Nor were the critical economic decisions of this time characterized by a meticulous concern for persuasive reasoning. Illinois
Central seems to have manufactured a historical limit on state
power to convey land largely out of decisions supporting the opposite position. Debs in essence allowed the executive branch to regulate railroads where Congress had not acted, on the ground that
regulation of railroads was within congressional power. Knight
mischaracterized an indictment involving interstate sales as one involving manufacturing. The Income Tax Case was internally inconsistent and overlooked strong arguments that would have supported the decision. Leisy was an unfocused collation of general
statements and quotations. Allgeyer's two critical holdings were
bare conclusions. Lochner ignored overwhelming facts about the
perils of baking. And the Court accepted the dicta of its predecessors respecting the meaning of due process and equal protection
without stopping to justify them.
There were some bright spots: Bradley's thorough exposition
in Hans, White's reconciliation of legislative and executive powers
in Buttfield, the efforts of Harlan and Brown to make sense of past
decisions on state power and the commerce clause, and Harlan's
dissents in Plessy v. Ferguson and E.C. Knight. In general, however, the great economic controversies of the turn of the century
produced few great opinions. How the same Justices performed in
cases more remote from the tensions of economic policy will be the
subject of the next installment in this series.

